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This study examines the Reserve Non-Prior Service Accession (NPS) program, 
the effects of the current training process on Reserve readiness, and the effects of various 
proposals for extending the active duty training period.  In particular, the thesis examines 
the effects of the extended training programs on recruiting using data derived from a 
web-based survey of NPS Reservists.  Multivariate logistic regression models are used to 
examine the effects of personal demographic characteristics on an individual’s likelihood 
to enlist in the NPS program for a 28-day or 77-day active duty training period.  Separate 
models are used for each program and include a model with the Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) as an option, and a model without it. Respondents report that they would have 
been slightly less inclined to enlist under the 28-day options whereas under the 77-day 
options respondents indicated that they would have been much less inclined to enlist.  A 
cost-effectiveness analysis is also conducted for both a 28-day and a 77-day training 
option. FY03 cost data is used to conduct the cost-effectiveness analysis, and indicates 
that the 28-day option would save an estimated $2.8 million and decrease NPS personnel 
training time by 5 months.  The 77-day option would cost an estimated additional $46.1 
million and decrease NPS personnel training time by 21 months.  Based on the analysis 
of this thesis, it is recommended that the current NPS accession program be phased out 
and the 77-day with DEP training alternative be implemented.  Additionally, the 
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The Reserve Force focuses on retaining our best people, recruiting to fill 
future needs, and sustaining end-strength….Our main recruiting concern at 
this time is that the sense of renewed patriotism following the attack upon 
our homeland did not translate into hikes in enlistment contracts.  The 
major change Naval Reserve recruiting has experienced since September 
11, 2001, is the decrease in Navy Veteran (NAVET) recruiting from about 
80% of SELRES accessions having been Navy veterans to around 55%.  
We believe that this is due to the desire of many sailors to remain on 
active duty to support our nation’s war on terrorism.  Reserve recruiting is 
closely monitoring this trend.  Coupled with the efforts outlined above and 
the renewed thrust into the non-prior service market, reserve recruiting is 
combating the downward trend in NAVET affiliations. 
VADM J. Totushek, USNR 
Chief of Naval Reserve  
Before the Personnel Senate 
Subcommittee on 
Active/Reserve  
Military Personnel Programs 
13 February 2002 
The Navy has downsized its forces considerably over the last decade.  Ship 
decommissionings, base closures, and the elimination of aviation programs have been 
part of the downsizing process.  At the same time, the role of the Naval Reserve has 
expanded.  In the present world environment, the Naval Reserve Force is called upon to 
play an increasingly active role in the daily operational requirements of the active Navy.  
Currently, the Naval Reserve represents 19 percent of the Navy’s total assets and is a 
significant force multiplier for the fleet to meet its growing global commitments.1 Thus, a 
greater degree of integration between Reserve and active-duty forces has occurred.  
A statement2 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and 
Personnel) current Department of Defense (DoD) policy for Reserve utilization says: 
 
                                                 
1 Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN), Chapter VIII-1. 
2 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Report, 1992, as cited in Grissmer, et al. p. 1. 
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It is DoD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units 
and manpower…. We plan to support military contingencies with Guard 
and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready 
within planned deployment schedules on a cost-effective basis (emphasis 
in the original).  
Availability is a measure of whether the required numbers and types of 
units and individuals can be used by the National Command Authorities.  
For units, ready means the ability to deploy without unacceptable delay; 
for individuals, it means qualified to perform assigned missions or 
functions.3 
One of the key challenges the Reserve Force has faced is the availability of 
trained personnel.  Reserve units are different from active forces in that the individuals 
who comprise the Reserve are volunteers who participate on a part-time basis.  They 
desire to perform their Reserve drill time close to home.  Additionally, many reservists 
cannot afford to spend long amounts of time away from their jobs or schooling to 
complete extensive military training.  Therefore, recruiters are constrained to recruit from 
local pools of available personnel with the hope that newly-signed reservists will already 
have some of the requisite training to perform their jobs.   
In the past, the recruiting force has focused its efforts on recruiting eligible 
members who have just separated from Navy active duty service.  These potential 
applicants are referred to as Navy veterans (NAVETS).  However, as mentioned in the 
Admiral’s statement above, there has been a decreasing number of available NAVETS, 
presenting a challenge for the Naval Reserve to meet its recruiting and end-strength 
goals.  To mitigate this, the Naval Reserve has increasingly relied on the recruitment of 
non-prior service accessions (NPS).  In 1999, the Non-prior Service Accession Program 
was implemented.  The aim of this program is to recruit qualified enlisted individuals into 
the Naval Reserve and provide them with the required training needed to make them an 
asset to both the Reserve and active force.4  
 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 1-02, December 1, 1989, as cited in Grissmer, et al., p. 1. 
4 COMNAVSERVTRACOM/COMAVRESFORCOM Instruction 3500.3, Non-Prior Service (NPS) 
Enlisted Personnel Accession Training and Qualification Management, October 2003, p. 2.    
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A. PURPOSE 
The objective of this thesis is to examine readiness in the Naval Reserve as it 
relates to the issue of non-prior service (NPS) enlistee accessions and their lengthy 
training completion time.  Historically, the focus has been on ensuring the Naval 
Reserve meets recruiting and end-strength goals.  The NPS Program has been extremely 
successful in helping the Naval Reserve in meeting its end-strength goals.  However, this 
program has had a secondary effect on Reserve readiness levels.  In this thesis, models to 
analyze the effects of alternative policies for accessing and training NPS personnel are 
developed.  In particular, several proposed alternatives have been made to reduce the 
required training time.  This thesis will analyze the costs and benefits of each plan.  It is 
hoped that this examination of the NPS program will assist the Naval Reserve Force in 
selecting the most effective method of training for NPS personnel. 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Alternative initial active-duty training sessions5 of various lengths will be 
examined to determine the impact of each on Reserve recruiting and readiness.  One 
proposed alternative is to lengthen the active-duty training period from the current 17 
days to 28 days.6  Another proposed alternative is to lengthen the active-duty training 
period from the current 17 days to 77 days.7  Both options would offer Reserve recruits 
the option of participating in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP)8 prior to starting the 
active duty period.  While the 28-day program would be an extension of the existing 
Reserve training structure, the 77-day program would be implemented by integrating 
NPS personnel into the current active-duty basic-training pipeline.   
                                                 
5 These training sessions would occur immediately after an enlistee affiliates with the Reserve unless 
the individual selects the Delayed Entry Program option (DEP).  
6 Jeff Knuth and David Rudd, 28-Day Proposal Letter Dated 10 July 2003.   
7 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program was similar to the proposed alternative in this thesis in that 
new Reserve recruits attended full basic training with their active-duty counterparts.  This program was 
discontinued. 
8 The Delayed Entry Program allows an individual who enlists to specify a future reporting date to 
attend the active duty period for basic training.  While in the program, the individual is under obligation to 
the military, but draws no pay or benefits. 
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An assumption of the analyses of the initial active-duty training proposals is that 
the achievement of an 80 percent readiness level9 is unlikely if the Reserve implements 
one of these programs while continuing to recruit 26 to 36-year old enlistees.  Members 
of the 17 to 21 year-old age group are more likely than members of the older group to 
consider affiliating if there is an initial training obligation.  A second assumption is that 
attrition rates of NPS recruits will decrease if the active-duty training occurs immediately 
upon enlistment.  This is based on the fact that a higher rate of NPS enlistee attrition 
currently occurs prior to attendance at basic training than after basic training is 
completed.10      
The major constraint associated with a change in training programs is the 
requirement for additional personnel and infrastructure to accommodate the in-processing 
and training of the additional Recruits.  Training now occurs at Reserve centers, but 
would be shifted to RTC Great Lakes if either of the alternatives were to be implemented.  
The requirement for additional instructors at Great Lakes would be greater for the 77-day 
proposed policy option than for the 28-day proposed policy option.   
C.  ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains seven chapters.  Chapter I provides an introduction and 
general overview of the area of analysis.  Chapter II provides background information on 
Naval Reserve recruiting issues and the Non-Prior Service Accession Program.  Chapter 
III outlines the framework for analysis and conducts a literature review relating to 
Reserve Force personnel.  Chapter IV describes model specification issues and the data 
used in the study.  Chapter V contains the results of the analysis based on the multivariate 
models.  Chapter VI presents a cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives to the current NPS 
training program.  Chapter VII offers conclusions and recommendations based on the 
study. 
                                                 
9 80% is the minimum acceptable readiness level for a unit or command as defined by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 
10 COMNAVRESFOR study on NPS attrition as cited by Knuth, Jeffrey and David Rudd, 28-day 
proposal letter dated 10 July 2003. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
“The mission of the U.S. Naval Reserve Force is to provide mission-capable units 
and individuals to the Navy-Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations 
from peace to war.”11  To meet this mission the Naval Reserve Force employs over 
690,000 reservists.  These reservists make up the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve 
and the Retired Reserve.  (For purposes of this thesis, the Standby and Retired Reserve 
components will not be addressed.)  The Ready Reserve consists of units or individuals 
who are subject to involuntary recall to active duty in time of war or national emergency.  
It contains two Reserve component subcategories:  the Selected Reserve (SELRES) and 
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  IRR personnel are pre-trained personnel not in a 
drill pay status, but with a legal, contractual obligation.  The majority of these individuals 
have recently served on active duty and are completing their Military Service Obligation 
(MSO).  SELRES are the primary source of trained units and personnel to augment the 
active forces in the event of war or national emergency.  It is comprised of personnel 
drilling in a pay status in structured or in specific mobilization billets.  SELRES 
personnel are managed and mobilized by Commander, Naval Reserve Forces 
(COMNAVRESFOR).12  This thesis deals primarily with the SELRES drilling 
population, specifically with those SELRES who are NPS personnel.  As of April 2004, 
the SELRES population is 70,757, of which 8,530 are NPS.13 
A. RESERVE RECRUITING THROUGH THE MID-1990’S 
In the past, the Reserve Recruiting Force focused a great deal of its efforts on 
recruiting eligible members who had recently completed active-duty service in any 
branch of the military.  These potential applicants are referred to as Navy veterans 
(NAVETs) or other service veterans (OSVETs).  However, because of a diminished 
number of available NAVETS and OSVETS in recent years due to high active duty 
                                                 
11 NAVPERS 15878H Navy Retention Team Manual. 
12 Reserve Component Categories of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs, November 2001. 
13 SELRES numbers derived from Commander Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR) 
Operations Department (N3) and the SELRES database managers (N6). 
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retention, the Naval Reserve has turned to recruiting individuals with no prior military 
experience.  Though NAVETs and OSVETs have been the preferred source of Reserve 
manpower over the years, individuals with no prior military experience have been a 
source of new accessions for the Naval Reserve since the 1970s.  In the past, these 
individuals were recruited into the Reserves under the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) 
program.14  Under the SAM program an individual was recruited into the Reserves but 
served a maximum of one year on active duty for training.  Following their active-duty 
time, he or she was obligated to affiliate with the Reserves for six years as a drilling 
reservist.  Approximately ten years ago this program was suspended, forcing recruiters to 
recruit solely from the NAVET and OSVET populations.  However, with the increasing 
success of active-duty retention in the last several years, the pool of potential 
NAVET/OSVET reservists has become progressively smaller.  This phenomenon has 
made it more difficult for the Reserve Force to meet its end-strength requirements.   
B. RESERVE RECRUITING SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2000 
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the Naval Reserve established the Non-prior Service 
Accession Course (NPSAC), now known as the Naval Reserve Accession Course 
(NRAC).  NRAC includes two recruiting programs:  the Advanced Pay-Grade (APG) 
program, which accesses personnel into temporary rates and pay-grades from E-3 to E-5; 
and the Accelerated Initial Accession (AIA) program, which accesses non-rated 
personnel into the temporary pay-grade of E-3.15  These recruiting programs are in 
addition to the traditional recruiting of NAVETS and OSVETS into the Reserves. 
A major difference between the original accession of non-prior service personnel 
and the current NRAC program is that full basic training and A-school advanced training  
                                                 
14 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program recruited individuals into the Naval Reserve, providing the 
individual with a maximum of 12 months of active duty for training before joining a Reserve unit.  This 
program targeted the E1-E4 shortages the Navy was experiencing and has since been discontinued and 
replaced with the current Naval Reserve Accession Course (NRAC) program. 
15 COMNAVSERVTRACOM/COMAVRESFORCOM, p. 4.    
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are not provided in the newer program.  The elimination of this training has had a 
profound effect on readiness and mobilization due to the increased time it takes for an 
NPS recruit under the NRAC program to complete necessary training requirements.16 
Another difference between the two programs is that the original program 
targeted individuals directly out of high school, while recruits into NRAC have until very 
recently been between 26 and 37 years of age.  This age requirement was imposed with 
the idea that older NPS individuals would be more mature, and would have higher levels 
of education and work experience.  Theoretically, these qualities would enhance the value 
of the individual to the Reserve Force.   
Recently, however, the Reserve Force has begun restructuring to include a larger 
percentage of junior personnel.  The goal of this restructuring is to satisfy new end-
strength requirements, and to provide NPS Reserve enlistees with the training necessary 
to make them assets to both the Reserve and active-duty forces.  Thus, NPS individuals 
may now be recruited from age 21.   
The NPSAC/NRAC recruiting program has been successful in that the Naval 
Reserve has either met or exceeded its recruiting goals for the past three years (Fiscal 
Years 2001-2003).  As shown in Table 1, NPS accessions have steadily increased rapidly 
over this period of time, with the percentage of NPS recruits more than doubling between 
FY 2001 and FY 2003.  However, the time it takes for these individuals to receive the 
required amount of training has created a challenge for the Naval Reserve in the areas of 








                                                 
16 R. K. Hudgens, Commander Naval Reserve Force letter dated 19 June 2003, p. 1. 
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Table 1. Reserve Non-prior Service Accessions, FY2000-FY2003 (From: 
COMNAVRESRECCOM, 2003) 
 








2000 18,410 14,907 2,983 20.01% 
2001 15,250 15,345 2,806 18.28% 
2002 15,000 15,335 4,970 32.41% 
2003 12,000 12,169 5,071 41.72% 
 
C. NPS PROGRAM ISSUE 
Title 10, Section 10147 of U.S. code states that no individual serving in either the 
active or Reserve components of the military may be deployed or mobilized overseas if 
he or she has not accumulated 84 days of active service.17  For individuals who enlist in 
active components, this requirement is met upon completion of their basic training and 
follow-on specialty training.  Those individuals who affiliate with the Reserve 
immediately after completion of active-duty enlistment contracts have already completed 
the minimum time required for mobilization and deployment.  However, a reservist 
serves only one weekend of Inactive Duty for Training (IADT) each month (drill time), 
and a 17-day Annual Training (AT) period of active duty per fiscal year.  NPS 
individuals who enlist in the Naval Reserve do not complete the 84-day minimum until 
they have participated in the Reserve for well over two years.  The long time period 
required for mobilization and deployment of the NPS enlistees adversely impacts Reserve 
readiness levels.  One of the major issues that exacerbates the problem is that the attrition 
rate for NPS individuals is extremely high, averaging 35 to 40 percent for two years of 





                                                 
17 DODINST 1215.19, Uniform Reserve, Training and Retirement Category Administration, 12 
December 2000.  
18 Government Accounting Office, “Reserve Components:  Factors Related to Personnel Attrition in 
the Selected Reserve,” Washington, D.C., April 1991. 
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D. NPS PERSONNEL ENLISTEE TRAINING 
Due to the increasing number of NPS personnel recruited into the Naval Reserve, 
the Reserve designed a formal training track for NPS enlistees to meet the 84-day 
requirement.  This training is divided into four phases: 
PHASE I/PHASE II.  This phase includes administrative processing, medical 
and dental screening, as well as physical training and ten hours of classroom instruction.  
These phases run concurrently and take the average NPS individual seven to nine months 
to complete. 
PHASE III.  This phase consists of an intense 17-day active duty course that 
encompasses military discipline, as well as physical, classroom, and experience-based 
training.  This phase is designed to be a compressed form of active-duty basic training 
and is conducted at the Great Lakes Recruit Training Center (RTC).  All NPS personnel 
must complete this phase within the first year of Reserve service. 
PHASE IV.  This phase includes additional Navy Military Training and 
professional requirements.  NPS enlistees must complete all rating coursework to 
participate in advancement exams.  This phase occurs at Naval Reserve Centers during 
drill periods and usually takes approximately 18 months to complete.   
Completion of all four phases and the attainment of mobilization/deployment 
eligibility by an NPS enlistee usually requires 2.5 years.  With the large increases in 
accessions into the NPS program over the last three years, the 84-day constraint makes it 
very challenging for the Naval Reserve to meet readiness and mobilization obligations. 
As of April 2004, the drilling population is 70,757.  8,530 of these individuals are 
NPS personnel, 12 percent of the current drilling population.  Of those, there are 7,886 
NPS recruits who have not completed the 84-day requirement.19  That is, 92 percent of 
the current NPS drilling population and 11 percent of the total Naval Reserve drilling 
population do not meet readiness requirements.  These enlistees count against Reserve 
Force end-strength, but cannot be mobilized or deployed.  Additionally, if an NPS 
individual leaves the Reserve Force prior to meeting the 84-day mobilization/deployment 
                                                 
19 COMNAVRESFOR Operations Department (N3), April 2004. 
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requirement he or she must be administratively separated, and may not be placed in the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) as currently defined.20  This is an important 
consideration, since IRR members can be mobilized as necessary to fulfill national 
defense requirements. 
 
                                                 
20 Veterans of Navy active duty, and active duty veterans from other services who affiliate with the 
Naval Reserve but fail to fulfill their drill obligations, may be placed in the IRR.   
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. STUDY BY SHIELLS21 
Shiells’ 1986, study “Affiliation of Navy Veterans With the Selected Reserve,” 
focuses on the recruiting of NAVETs into the Reserves.  Market conditions such as 
unemployment rates and pay and demographic categories such as age, gender, race and 
education are used to forecast individual affiliation rates by rating and by geographic 
area.  Using this information, the study examines the responsiveness of Reserve 
affiliation rates to pay changes. 
An empirical model of the determinants of NAVET affiliation rates is developed 
and estimated using an active duty retention model as a guide.  In this study, pay is 
measured by taking total annual reserve drill pay for a certain pay grade and length of 
service and incorporating annual affiliation bonus amounts.  This combined amount is 
then adjusted for inflation.  This allows the assumption that one extra dollar of pay will 
have the same effect on the probability of affiliating, whether that extra dollar comes 
from higher drill pay, increases in bonuses, or decreased price levels.   
The data is derived from the Enlisted Master Records held by the Bureau of Navy 
Personnel.  The data identifies individuals who left active duty between the years 1979 
and 1984, and whether they had affiliated with the Navy Reserves by 1985.  For 
consistency, only those affiliating within one year of leaving active duty are included.  
The data is further filtered to include only those first-term enlisted NAVETS in pay 
grades E-3 through E-6, under the age of 39, who are reenlistment eligible.  Any 
individual who has a reserve obligation written into his or her initial active duty contract 
is also excluded.  This left a total sample size of 147,735. 
A maximum likelihood logistic estimation model is used to estimate individual 
affiliation probabilities.  Estimation is done separately for each of the eleven rating 
groups.  The dependent variable is the log of the odds that a NAVET would join the 
                                                 
21 Martha E. Shiells, “Affiliation of Navy Veterans With the Selected Reserve,” Center for Naval 
Analyses, December 1986. 
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Reserves.  This is constructed as a dummy variable with 1 identifying those who affiliate 
with the Reserves, and 0 otherwise.  The explanatory variables used in this study include 
real reserve wages (combination of annual drill pay and affiliation bonuses), 
unemployment rates (based on manufacturing workers for each state), pay grade, 
education (dummy variable that equals 1 for non-high school grad/earned GED, and is 0 
otherwise), ability (dummy variable that equals 1 if AFQT scores in Category III or 
lower, and is 0 otherwise), sex, race, marital status, age, and census regions (based on 
home of record).  As stated earlier, the pay variable consists of both annual drill pay and 
affiliation bonus amounts.   
The results in this study found that there are significant, positive relationships 
between affiliation rates and both Reserve pay and civilian unemployment rates.  The pay 
elasticities vary amongst rating groups, but do not vary amongst census regions.  What is 
key in this study are the pay elasticities, which ranged from .77 for construction ratings to 
1.95 for administrative and clerical ratings.  On average, the affiliation bonus (at the level 
of $300 per year) results in a three percent increase in Reserve accessions for every 100 
first-term eligible veterans.   
B. STUDY BY KIRBY AND GRISSMER22 
Kirby and Grissmer’s 1993 study, “Reassessing Enlisted Reserve Attrition:  A 
Total Force Perspective,” examines NPS Reservists and their attrition rates prior to the 
expiration of the enlisted member’s term of service.  Those who had fulfilled their initial 
contractual obligation are not included as the interest is mainly early attrition rates.  It is 
important to note how attrition is defined in this study:  from a total force perspective, 
only losses to civilian life and not those individuals who return to some sort of active 
participation in either a reserve or active component should be included in the measure of 
attrition.23 
 
                                                 
22 Sheila N. Kirby and David W. Grissmer, “Reassessing Enlisted Reserve Attrition:  A Total Force 
Perspective,” RAND, 1993. 
23 Individuals who transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) do not count as active participants 
and thus are considered to be losses. 
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The data used in this study includes individuals who entered the Reserves at 
different times, but had the same observation ending time of September 1988.  So, for 
those who separated before this date, time served is actually known.  However, for those 
who stayed, only time served from time of entry to the observed end time is known.  
Since this data is right-censored data,24 the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which analyzes 
survival data containing censored observations, is used to study the allocation of attrition 
times and how the timing of attrition differs across different subgroups.  The conclusions 
show that only 30 to 50 percent of all losses are to civilian life.  About 25 percent of 
Reserve losses are individuals who return to some component of active service and 25 to 
50 percent of losses return to serve in the same or a different Reserve component.  Also, 
the two Air Reserve components have the lowest attrition rates with the Marine Corps 
having the highest.  The authors conclude that the perception that reserve attrition is 
extremely high is not accurate.  While there is considerable turnover of Reservists, not all 
of the status changes are losses to civilian life. 
C. STUDY BY CAREY, et al.25 
This 2002 study, “Alternative Concepts for Employing Navy Reservists:  Making 
an Impact on Force Capabilities,” focuses on recognizing and illustrating ways to 
improve capabilities and/or alleviate constraints in the Navy and Marine Corps.  
Specifically, the study attempts to document the potential impact that Reserves have on 
increasing overall force capabilities.   
Seven areas in which the use of Reservists could extend the capabilities of the 
Active Navy are examined.  These include carrier and carrier aviation, maintenance, 
surface combatants, assistance during nondeployed periods, and the emerging skill niches  
 
                                                 
24 Any unit that is removed from a reliability test prior to failure, or a unit that is in the field and is still 
operating at the time the reliability of these units is to be determined is called a right-censored data 
observation. 
25 Neil B. Carey, James M. Jondrow, Angelyn Jewell, Timothy A. Roberts, Carol S. Moore, Rebecca 
L. Kirk, John P. Hall, and John D. Keenan, “Alternative Concepts for Employing Navy Reservists:  Making 
an Impact on Force Capabilities,” Center For Naval Analyses, August 2002. 
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of linguistics, intelligence, and security/force protection.  Characteristics unique to 
military service are accounted for when examining each area; these include forward 
deployment, transit time constraints, and IDTC26 workup schedules. 
The results show that all seven concepts would be feasible if the following 
conditions are met:  additional funding for travel; inclusion of reservists in training and 
exercises specific to areas where Reserve augmentation would benefit the Navy; and 
most importantly, appropriate training to fill augmentation requirements.  Specifically, a 
change in the current method of Navy Reservist training is required to emphasize rate and 
specific NEC training, especially in those areas that provide the highest return on 
investment for the Navy.   
D. STUDY BY MARQUIS AND KIRBY27 
Marquis and Kirby’s 1989 study, “Reserve Accessions Among Individuals with 
Prior Military Service,” examines the accession behavior of prior service reservists who 
served in the Active Army and either the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard in 
order to determine the optimal mix of prior and non-prior service personnel.  The main 
focus is to discover which policies appear to increase accessions among prior service 
personnel, highlighting pay and compensation packages.  Additionally, time elapsed 
between leaving active duty and affiliating with a reserve component is examined to 
determine whether skill degradation has occurred and whether these individuals are being 
placed in occupations that match the skills acquired on active duty.  The authors 
emphasize that assigning new Reserve affiliates to Reserve occupations different than 
they previously held on active duty has detrimental training and readiness ramifications.  
If the training and experience received on active duty is not utilized in the Reserves, than 
the reduction in training costs thought to be gained by employing prior active duty 
members may never be realized. 
 
                                                 
26 IDTC is the Interdeployment Training Cycle, in which Navy ships deploy for short periods of time 
to perform exercises and test equipments and skills that are necessary for successful deployment. 
27 M. Susan Marquis and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, “Reserve Accessions Among Individuals with Prior 
Military Service:  Supply and Skill Match,” RAND, October 1989. 
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The authors use cohort data consisting of individuals who separated from the 
Active Army or its Reserve components between FY 1979 and FY 1984.  Additionally, 
FY 1985 data is examined to see whether any individuals who separated from any of the 
Army components during this period affiliated with one of the Selected Reserve 
components.   
The authors specify a Reserve affiliation model using two types of explanatory 
variables:  baseline characteristics of each individual at time of separation such as age, 
years of service, and education; and measures that influence a return to Reserve service 
such as Reserve drill pay, affiliation bonuses, and civilian wage rate.  Survival analysis 
using the Kaplan-Meier estimator is performed to examine both the distribution of times 
accession in the Reserve Components occurs and how the timing of accession differs 
amongst Reservists with differing demographic characteristics.  This allows the authors 
to see how variations in one characteristic affect the timing of accessions.  Additionally, 
to estimate the effects of one characteristic while controlling for all others, the authors 
use a Cox proportional hazards model.28  This method is used because it is more flexible 
in its assumptions than alternative hazard models.   
The results showed that those who separate from a Reserve component have a 
lower rate of rejoining the Reserves than those who leave active Army service and join 
the Reserves.  Additionally, those who leave active service tend to affiliate with a 
Reserve component within one year of separating from active service whereas those 
separating from a Reserve component who reaffiliate with the Reserves tend to have a 
break in service of at least two years.   
Military pay increases have a positive effect on Reserve accessions from both 
prior active duty personnel and prior Reserve personnel, especially amongst those with a 
break in service of less than six months.  Affiliation bonuses also have a positive effect 
on the propensity to enlist in the Reserves after separating from active duty, with the  
                                                 
28 D. R. Cox, “Regression Models and Life Tables (with discussion),” 1972, as cited by Marquis and 
Kirby, October 1989, pp. 11-12. 
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highest likelihood occurring within the first three months after separation.  Civilian 
influences such as wage and unemployment rate also proved to have an influence over 
individuals’ accession decisions. 
Individual characteristics also proved to have a strong effect on accession.  Older, 
more experienced individuals separating from active duty are much less likely to affiliate 
with a Reserve Component than younger, less experienced individuals.  Additionally, 
those with less education and lower aptitude scores show a higher propensity to join the 
Reserves than their more educated counterparts. 
The results for skill-set match showed that those who separate from active duty 
and affiliate with the Army Reserve rather than the National Guard were significantly 
more likely to have a skill match.  Furthermore, the authors found that a skill match is 
less likely for more experienced personnel and more likely for those with short breaks in 
service.  
The authors determined that the results from their study are valuable for future 
manpower policy decisions concerning the recruiting tradeoff of non-prior service versus 
prior service personnel, specifically when looking at the investments in training required 
for non-prior service personnel.  Additionally, the results show that targeting certain 
demographic groups may increase accession and retention of prior service personnel. 
E. STUDY BY TAN29 
Tan’s 1991 study, “Non-Prior Service Reserve Enlistments:  Supply Estimates 
and Forecasts,” examines the effects of recruiter behavior and the potential impact of 
competition for non-prior service individuals amongst the Naval Reserve, Army Reserve, 
and the Army National Guard.  Additionally, models are used to develop predictions of 
non-prior service enlistments, using changing economic circumstances.  Also, the author 
performs a data scrub and inputted missing data from Reserve Components Common 
                                                 
29 Hong W. Tan, “Non-Prior Service Reserve Enlistments:  Supply Estimates and Forecasts,” RAND, 
1991. 
 16
Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) files.30  The author develops algorithms to account for 
missing data problems because there are several gaps in the historical data series, 
especially for AFQT scores, schools attended, and geographic location.  This missing 
data causes problems in creating reliable cross-sectional time-series databases necessary 
for estimating aggregate supply models.  These algorithms are used to impute the missing 
data for each Reserve component and thus prevent artificially lowering enlistment 
numbers.   
The author estimates enlisted supply models for the Selected Reserve, and notes 
the following issues that must be considered:  the distinctive features of the Selected 
Reserve of moonlighting and localized recruiting that emphasize the significance of 
controlling for characteristics of the local labor market; NPS enlisted supply models 
cannot be estimated separately from other enlistment categories because of recruiter 
responses to adjustments in recruiting targets of NPS and prior service recruits;31 and a 
Reserve Component’s ability to attract NPS recruits when competing with other Reserve 
and active duty Components.   
Estimated supply parameters are used to forecast NPS reserve enlistments for 
Fiscal years 1987 through 1994.  Forecasts are compared with actual NPS enlistments.  
These forecasts are also used to predict the feasibility of NPS enlistment goals under 
changing economic circumstances.  This is done using Military Enlistment Processing 
Station (MEPS)32 data to predict national NPS reserve enlistment numbers.   
The study found that for the Army Reserve there is a negative tradeoff of three to 
four prior service enlistments for one NPS enlistment.  That is, the corresponding prior 
service tradeoff for high quality NPS males is about five to one, signifying that they are 
approximately five times harder to recruit than prior service enlistees.  However, for both 
                                                 
30 The Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System has since been replaced with the Navy 
Systems Information Personnel (NSIPS) system.  These systems contain information on every Reservist in 
the Navy, regardless of category, and provides recruiting, enlistment, reenlistment, separation, and 
demographic information on each individual. 
31 Earlier studies have not accounted for the demand-side effects of recruiters and goals on Reserve 
enlistments, mainly because of the scarcity of goal data.  Typically, NPS and prior service enlistments have 
been estimated using separate models.  As cited by Tan, 1991, p. 7.   
32 MEPS are where new recruits are processed and prepared to be shipped to basic training. 
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the National Guard and Naval Reserve components, the tradeoff is positive, indicating 
that for these Reserve Components the recruitment of NPS is less difficult than prior 
service individuals.  It should be noted that the author found these positive results to be 
irregular and recommends further research on these two Reserve components.33 
There is little evidence found that competition amongst the components harmed 
recruiting efforts, with the exception of the Naval Reserve’s SAM program, particularly 
in the recruitment of high-quality males.  With regards to recruiting goals, all three 
components are shown to have unattainable recruiting goals given the assumptions of 
reasonable growth of the recruiter population.  Only with significant expansion of 
recruiting assets could the forecast goals be met. 
F. STUDY BY GRISSMER, et al.34 
This 1997 study, “Prior Service Personnel:  A Potential Constraint on Increasing 
Reliance on Reserve Forces,” examines the possible constraint on the Reserve Forces’ 
reliance on experienced veterans for Reserve service because of a decrease in availability 
of these individuals.  As the active forces draw down their end-strength numbers, an 
increasing dependence on the Reserves ensues.  However, as active forces become 
smaller, the flow of experienced personnel from active duty into the Reserves becomes 
smaller.  The Reserves then must depend on NPS personnel, who have less experience 
than their prior service counterparts, and thus may potentially adversely impact Reserve 
readiness.  The authors predict the prospective prior active service content of the Reserve 
components under differing active and Reserve force size circumstances.  Additionally, 
the differences between prior service and NPS personnel and their importance relative to 
Reserve readiness are addressed. 
The authors’ analysis focuses on the mix of prior service and NPS personnel in 
the six Reserve Components and explains the wide variance among Components in the 
utilization of prior service.  (For purposes of this thesis, only the Navy enlisted results 
                                                 
33 Tan recommends further research is needed as to why the results for these two components were 
positive to better understand how this occurred. 
34 David W. Grissmer, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Richard Buddin, Jennifer Kawata, Jerry Sollinger, and 
Stephanie Williamson, “Prior Service Personnel:  A Potential Constraint on Increasing Reliance on Reserve 
Forces,” RAND, 1997. 
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will be discussed.)  A model predicting active force losses, accessions, and inventories is 
developed, using FY 1993-1997 data to reflect the active force drawdown and FY 1987-
1989 data to reflect continuation rates for those unaffected by the reduction in force.  The 
authors make several assumptions when building the model: that prior active accessions 
are “first-choice” accessions – that they are preferred over NPS accessions or Reserve 
prior service accessions, and NPS personnel are recruited into the Reserves only when the 
prior service accession supply is depleted; downsizing would end in FY 1997; and that 
some downsizing is done through natural occurrences such as retirements, and voluntary 
separation programs. 
The results of the study show that a scenario where the Reserve Force size is large 
and there is a low propensity to enlist in the Naval Reserve produces a decrease in the 
prior service accessions percentage.  The Naval Reserve has the largest active/Reserve 
ratios of all Reserve Components, so a smaller proportion of NAVETs can be utilized.  
Additionally, the Naval Reserve’s billet structure requires almost one-third of its 
positions to be filled by junior personnel; these positions are normally filled by NPS 
recruits.  This, coupled with the fact that the active Navy will suffer fewer cuts than the 
other active components, will leave the Naval Reserve less vulnerable than other Reserve 
Components in the recruitment of prior-service personnel.  Lastly, since the Naval 
Reserve takes in the second-highest proportion of active veterans, it is already at or near 
its supply constraint.  Therefore, the Reserve Force could absorb some of the effects of 
downsizing without decreasing its prior service numbers. 
G. IMPLICATIONS OF PRIOR STUDIES ON CURRENT RESEARCH 
There have been many studies on the Reserve Components and the differing 
effects that occur from accessing NPS and prior-service personnel.  The decline in 
availability of prior-service individuals for service in the Reserves and the resulting 
increase in NPS accessions is a common problem among all Reserve Components.  
Increases in pay and compensation packages are shown to have a positive effect on 
whether or not individuals affiliate with the Reserves.  The studies imply that a policy 
that would mitigate the readiness impacts of accessing large numbers of NPS recruits and 
having them serve on an extended period of active duty to receive the necessary training 
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would be to increase pay.  Using pay and bonus incentives could offset the negative 
affects of the proposed training policies for NPS personnel.  These incentives would 
enhance the palatability of longer active duty periods and mitigate potential negative 
constraints of family and civilian job pressures.35 
  
                                                 
35 David W. Grissmer, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Richard Buddin, Jennifer Kawata, Jerry Sollinger, and 
Stephanie Williamson, “Prior Service Personnel:  A Potential Constraint on Increasing Reliance on Reserve 
Forces,” RAND, 1997. Also see, Hong W. Tan, “Non-Prior Service Reserve Enlistments:  Supply 
Estimates and Forecasts,” RAND, 1991, and M. Susan Marquis and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, “Reserve 
Accessions Among Individuals with Prior Military Service:  Supply and Skill Match,” RAND, October 
1989. 
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IV. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
The data used in this analysis is derived from a web-based survey designed by the 
author.  The survey was posted on the Reserve Forces Command web page and 
disseminated to the 8,530 NPS individuals currently serving in the Reserves.  It was 
restricted by social security number so only NPS individuals could complete the survey 
and each individual could only complete it one time.  The survey consists of 15 
questions, 11 of which are demographic.  A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix 
A.   
The demographic questions identify each individual’s age, gender, marital status, 
education level, annual income, number of children, current paygrade, time in service, 
and whether or not they had attended the 17-day basic training program currently in 
place.  The four remaining questions deal directly with the two proposed training policy 
alternatives.  Specifically, each NPS individual is asked whether they would join the 
Reserves if there were a 28-day active duty obligation that commenced immediately upon 
joining; if there were a 28-day active duty obligation that allowed for up to 12 months in 
the DEP; if there were a 77-day active duty obligation that commenced immediately upon 
joining; or if there were a 77-day active duty obligation that allowed for up to 12 months 
in the DEP.  For clarity, a comprehensive definition and description of the DEP was 
provided within the survey.  There were four choices for each of these four questions:  
“Extremely likely,” “likely,” “not very likely,” and “no chance.”  The survey was 
available on-line for six weeks to allow coverage of at least one drill weekend for each 
Reserve Center.  At survey completion, 28 percent of the 8,530 NPS individuals surveyed 
had responded, resulting in a sample size of 2,366.  
The intent of the survey was to examine an individuals’ likelihood of enlisting in 
the Naval Reserve if either the two 28-day training alternatives or the two 77-day training 
alternatives were implemented.  It is worth noting that the individuals who responded to 
the survey are already serving in the Naval Reserve under the current 17-day training 
program.  As such, when referring to an individual’s or group of individual’s “propensity  
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to enlist,” or “likelihood to enlist,” the author is referring to a hypothetical situation 
concerning the survey respondents’ inclination to enlist under the proposed training 
alternatives. 
B. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1. Methodology 
Upon completion of the survey, the responses (in Excel format) were imported 
into the SAS software program.  SAS is a full-featured data management, analysis, and 
presentation product; it can perform a variety of data analysis and presentation tasks, 
consisting of statistical analyses and graphical presentation of data.36  This allowed for 
the creation of categorical dummy variables (variables that take on the value of either 
zero or one); filtering out of any questions left blank by respondents; and the calculation 
of the chi-square statistic.  When using survey data, chi-square is the most common 
analysis used.  It is suitable when the data consists of frequency counts in distinct, 
mutually exclusive, and comprehensive categories.  That is, it should be possible to count 
how many individuals fall into which category with every individual falling in some 
category and no one falling in more than one category.37  For the survey responses, the 
frequencies are outlined by subcategory of each question in the survey.  It is used for 
testing hypotheses concerning relationships between categorical variables – in this case, 
between each subcategory of the demographic questions in the survey (explanatory 
variables) and the four questions dealing with the two proposed alternative training 
policies (dependent variables).38  
2. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents 
Table 2 provides the number and percentages by category of the survey 
respondents.  Each category is further subdivided to show specific categories of interest.  
For example, 60 percent of survey respondents are Caucasian males, more than four 
times as many as any other group.  Two-thirds of respondents are male.  Three out of four 
respondents (74%) are over the age of 27.  Almost half of those surveyed are married and 
                                                 
36 http://www.utexas.edu/cc/stat/software/sas/. Accessed May 2004. 
37 http://www.nku.edu/mcdaniel/tools/chihowto.html. Accessed May 2004. 
38 http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ballc/webtools/web_chi_tut.html. Accessed May 2004. 
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have no children.  38 percent have taken some college-level courses but have not 
received a college degree.  Almost 50 percent have an annual income of $35,000 or less.  
Of those surveyed, 47 percent are E-3s, and more than one-fourth have at least one year, 
but fewer than two years, of service in the Naval Reserve.  This time in service 
corresponds with the fact that 73 percent of respondents have attended NRAC in Great 
Lakes as this training is typically completed within the first year of enlisting.  More than 
70 percent of respondents indicate that they would likely still affiliate with the Naval 
Reserve if the active duty training requirement were 28 days in length, whether the DEP 
option is available or not.  However, if the active duty training requirement were 77 days 
in length, only 28 percent say they would affiliate if no DEP option were offered, and 43 
percent say they would if the DEP option were available.   
 
Table 2. NPS Personnel Survey Respondents Broken Down by Category 
 
Variable Number Percentage 
Age 
     18-22 
     23-26 
     27-34 
     35 and over  
 
  149 
  465 
  871 
  871 
 





     Male 
     Female 
 
1564 





     Asian/Pacific Islander/Other 
     Black 
     Caucasian 
     Hispanic  
 
  300 
  289 
1404 







     Divorced 
     Married 
     Never been married 
     Separated      
 
  307 
1153 
  820 





  2.94 
Number of Children 
     None 
     One 
     Two 
     Three 
     Four or more 
 
  976 
  396 
  526 
  257 






  8.06 
Education 
     GED 
     High School Diploma 
     Some College 
     Associates Degree 
     Bachelors Degree 
 
  136 
  251 
  897 
  341 
  518 
 






Variable Number Percentage 
     Masters Degree 
     PhD 
  164 
    36 
  7.00 
  1.54 
Income 
     Less than 25K 
     $25K-$34,999K 
     $35K-$44,999K 
     $45K-$54,999K 
     $55K-$64,999K 
     $65K and over 
 
  696 
  593 
  411 
  244 
  160 






  6.82 
10.32 
Pay Grade 
     E3 
     E4 
     E5 
     E6 
 
1088 
  738 
  372 





  4.00 
Length of Service 
     2 to 3 Months 
     4 to 6 Months 
     6 to 9 Months 
     9 to 12 Months 
     More than 12 Months 
     More than 24 Months 
 
  273 
  304 
  344 
  345 
  628 














28 Day No DEP Option 
     Extremely likely/Likely 
     Not likely/No chance 
 
1696 




28 Day With DEP Option 
     Extremely likely/Likely 
     Not likely/No chance 
 
1642 




77 Day No DEP Option 
     Extremely likely/Likely 







77 Day DEP Option 
     Extremely likely/Likely 








3. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents as Compared to the Four 
Training Policy Alternatives 
Table 3 shows the percentage in each demographic category “likely to affiliate” 
with the Naval Reserve under each alternative.  Recall that respondents are classified as 
“likely to affiliate” if they chose either “Extremely likely” or “likely” as their response to 
the questions on the survey.   
a. 28-Day Alternative Training Policy (No DEP) 
The majority of respondents, regardless of age, indicate a likelihood that 
they would affiliate with the Naval Reserve.  However, the propensity to enlist and 
respondents’ age have an inverse relationship - the older the individual, the less likely 
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he/she is to affiliate.  For those age 27 and older, their propensity to enlist is more than 14 
percentage points lower than those ages 18-22.  This is noteworthy because the target 
population for recruiting NPS personnel has typically been those between the ages of 27 
and 36, which represents the ages of the majority NPS personnel currently serving.   
Gender makes no difference in the decision to affiliate under this proposal.  
Both male and female respondents show a high propensity to enlist under this proposal, at 
72 percent.  However, ethnicity does seem to have an effect on the decision to enlist.  
Although the vast majority indicates a likeliness to enlist under this program, Caucasians, 
who represent the majority of the sample, reflect a propensity to enlist that is more than 5 
percentage points lower than Blacks, and 3 percentage points lower than Hispanics.39 
Marital status also has an effect on propensity to join.  Across all 
subcategories, respondents indicate a high likelihood to join; however, those who are 
married show a likelihood to enlist that is more than 11 percentage points lower than 
those who have never been married.  This is significant as the majority of those NPS 
currently recruited into the Naval Reserve are married. 
The number of children and the propensity to enlist under this alternative 
also share an inverse relationship.  Those with no children have the highest positive 
propensity, and propensity decreases with each additional child.  Those with no children 
represent the majority of those surveyed, and show a likelihood to join that is 3 
percentage points higher than those with two children, who represent the next highest 
proportion of those surveyed.   
Education is inversely proportional to the propensity to enlist under this 
program: the higher education level of the individual, the less likely they are to join.  
Those with a high school level education or with some college courses show a likelihood 
that is 6 percentage points higher than those with a two-year degree and 9 percentage  
                                                 
39 The “Other” category, although reflects the highest percentage of those likely to enlist under the 28-
day NO DEP option, represent only 3 percent of the sample and thus is not considered to be significant. 
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points higher than those with a four-year degree.  Those with some college courses 
represent the biggest proportion of those surveyed, and fit the current demographics of 
those recruited into the NPS program. 
The majority of those surveyed have an annual income between $25,000 
and $35,000 and these individuals reflect the highest propensity to join under this 
program.  The likelihood to join declines sharply when an individual’s annual income 
reaches $45,000 and higher.  These individuals show a likelihood to enlist that is 13 
percentage points lower than those in the lower income brackets.   
The majority of NPS are pay grade E-3 and these individuals show the 
highest propensity to enlist under this program.  They show a likelihood that is more than 
7 percentage points higher than those in pay grades E-4 or E-5.  It is worth noting that the 
majority of NPS personnel accessed into the Reserves enter at pay grade E-3 or higher as 
they are given credit for their civilian education and experience.  
Most individuals surveyed indicated they would likely enlist under this 
alternative, regardless of time in the Reserves.  However, those with six months or fewer 
have a propensity that is five percentage points higher than those with more than six 
months service time, with the exception of those with service time between 9 and 12 
months.  Those with service time between 9 and 12 months have an enlistment propensity 
that is than 10 percentage points lower than those in other categories.  This could be 
explained by the fact that at this point in their training, the majority of NPS individuals 
are preparing to leave for NRAC training at Great Lakes, and are apprehensive about 
what to expect.  This is supported by the fact that the likelihood increases for those with 
more than 12 months of service by 9 percentage points. 
Individuals who have already attended NRAC represent the majority of 
those surveyed and reflect an extremely high propensity to enlist under this program, at 
72 percent.  This is important because it suggests that the experience these individuals 
had during NRAC was a positive one as they would still be willing to attend if the active 
duty training period was extended. 
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b. 28-Day Alternative Training Policy (With DEP)  
Across all categories, the likelihood of enlisting under this alternative is 
lower than in the option when DEP was not available.  However, there are notable 
differences in several categories and these are discussed below. 
Those age 27 and over are still less likely to enlist than those who are 
younger, but those ages 18 to 22 show a decline in propensity to enlist that is 7 
percentage points lower as compared to the no DEP option.  This could be attributed to 
the fact that these individuals have recently finished high school, are enrolled in college, 
and have not established a career.  They may not be willing to enlist if they have to wait 
up to 12 months to begin receiving pay.  Earlier studies have shown that pay is a strong 
incentive for those coming out of high school and affiliating with any component of the 
military. 
With regards to ethnicity, all categories with the exception of those who 
are Caucasian indicated a lower propensity to enlist under the DEP option.  However, 
Caucasians showed that there is a 2-percentage point higher propensity than the former 
alternative.  This seems to suggest the fact that those in the higher annual income 
categories are more inclined to enlist if DEP is an option, reflecting a 5-percentage point 
difference over the no DEP option.  The flexibility that DEP offers may be more 
palatable to career-minded individuals as they would have time to arrange for work 
absences.  Additionally, since these individuals tend to fill jobs that are more career-
oriented, many employers offer some sort of pay even when their employee is serving a 
Reserve obligation.  Conversely, those in minority ethnic categories may not be willing to 
enlist under the DEP as these individuals typically come from lower socio-economic 
circumstances and cannot afford to delay enlisting and thus delay being placed in a pay 
status. 
c. 77-Day Alternative Training Policy (No DEP) 
This training alternative shows sharp declines across all categories with 
regards to propensity to enlist in the Naval Reserve.  Even for those with the highest 
propensity to enlist in each category, they still have a propensity of 50 percent or less. 
This could be explained by the fact that almost all Reservists are either in school full-time 
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or have a career.  In either case, they may be unwilling or unable to leave their civilian 
responsibilities for such a long time period.  Those with the most notable changes are 
discussed below. 
Those individuals age 27 and older show a 13-percentage point lower 
propensity to enlist under this alternative than those ages 18 to 22, and more than a 30-
percentage point lower propensity than they showed in both 28-day alternatives.  
Additionally, although those ages 18 to 22 show the highest propensity to enlist under 
this program, these individuals show a 25 percentage point lower propensity for this 
option as compared to the 28-day DEP alternative and a 30 percentage point lower 
propensity as compared to the 28-day no DEP option.  This indicates that the older the 
individual the less likely they are to enlist under this alternative, and that the 28-day 
alternative is more palatable to both groups.   
A decline in likelihood to enlist is evident across all ethnic groups.  
However, the sharpest declines are for Caucasians, who are more than 30 percentage 
points less likely to enlist they are for either 28-day option, and for Hispanics, who are 
more than 35 percentage points less likely to enlist than they are under the 28-day no 
DEP option.  This again may be contributed to differing socio-economic circumstances 
amongst ethnic groups.   
Across education subcategories, there are large declines in likelihood to 
join.  The largest decreases are evident for individuals with some college, who are more 
than 30 percentage points less likely to enlist than those with a four-year degree when 
compared to the likelihood for both 28-day options.   
d.  77-Day Alternative Training Policy (With DEP) 
This alternative also reveals a much lower likelihood to enlist than both of 
the  28-day options, and also tends to show a lower likelihood than the 77-Day no DEP 
option, especially for those who are younger, single, have less education and income, and 
are a member of a minority group.  This is not surprising since the same differences are 
seen between the two 28-day options.  However, the majority of those in the highest 
subcategories represent 50 percent or less of the total number.  This indicates that the 77-
day DEP option is the least attractive of the four options, with the possible exception for 
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those who are older, more educated, and in higher income brackets.  More flexibility in 
reporting for active duty is more attractive to those who find it more difficult to leave 
their civilian jobs. 
What is common amongst all these categories is that the younger, less 
educated and less experienced individuals are more likely to enlist under these four 
training options.  However, these individuals do not reflect the demographic makeup of 
those currently in the NPS program.   
 
Table 3. Percentage Likely to Affiliate with the Naval Reserve by Policy Option and 
Demographic Characteristic 
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a Those represented as “other” are excluded as they represent less than three percent of those surveyed 
b Those represented as “separated” are excluded as they represent less than three percent of those surveyed 
c Those with Doctoral Degrees are excluded as they represent less than two percent of those surveyed 
d Those in paygrades E1 and E2 are excluded as, combined, they represent less than one percent of those surveyed 
e Those with less than one month of service time are excluded as they represent less than one percent of those surveyed 
 
C. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Table 4 defines the variables used in each regression model.  Four different 
dependent variables are used in four separate models to provide reliable estimates of the 
effect of each explanatory variable on the positive propensity to enlist under each of the 
four alternative training policies.  The sample data set includes all respondents to the 
survey. 
1. Models of the Four Proposed Alternative Training Policies 
Multivariate logistic regression models are used to estimate the probability of 
enlisting in the Naval Reserves under one of the four alternative training policies.  The 
specification of each of the four models involves regressing the positive propensity for 
each of the four program options on the same set of explanatory variables.  The basic 
model specification is as follows: 
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0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13
POSITIVE ( j) FEMALE AGE23TO26 AGE27OVR SINGLE
DIVORCED GED SMCOL COLDEG
AT25T044 OVER45 API BLACK HISP;
=β +β +β +β +β
+β +β +β +β
+β +β +β +β +β
 
where POSITIVE (j) equals POS28IMMED; POS28DEP; POS77IMMED; and 
POS77DEP. 
The Log-Likelihood Ratio Test (LLR) is used to determine joint significance of 
all estimated coefficients; the LLR tests whether a group of independent variables have 
an effect on the dependent variable.  It is a measure of joint significance for the entire 
logit model, which is estimated via maximum likelihood procedures.  It restricts the 
estimated regression equation so that the estimated coefficients are equal to zero.  It then 
compares the overall fit of the model for both the restricted equation and the unrestricted 
equation to establish if including the independent variables produces a better fit to the 
model.40  All four of the estimated logit models listed above were tested for joint 
significance.  The p-value for the LLR test is included in each table of results below.  The 
explanatory variables used in the models all prove to be significant in explaining the 
dependent variables.   
Those characteristics that represent the majority of observations in each category 
form the base case for each explanatory variable.  The base case for each category is:  
gender (MALE), age (AGE18TO22), marital status (MARRIED), educ (HSDIP), income 
(LESS25), and race (CAUC).  The same base cases are used for all four regression 
models.  The marginal effect of each explanatory variable is calculated by comparing the 
probability of enlisting for the base case with the probability of enlisting when each 
explanatory variable is increased by one unit with all other variables held constant.  Since 






                                                 
40 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge “Introductory Econometrics:  A Modern Approach, 2e,” Ohio, 2003, pp. 
144, 558-559. 
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Table 4. Explanation of Variables Names and Definitions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE NAMES VARIABLES DEFINED 
POS28IMMED =1 if likely to enlist under 28-day alternative 
training policy/no DEP option 
POS28DEP =1 if likely to enlist under 28-day alternative 
training policy/DEP option 
POS77IMMED =1 if likely to enlist under 77-day alternative 
training policy/no DEP option 
POS77DEP =1 if likely to enlist under 77-day alternative 
training policy/DEP option 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE NAMES  
AGE18TO22 =1 if respondents between ages 18 and 22 
AGE23TO26 =1 if respondents between ages of 23 and 26 
AGE27OVR =1 if respondents ages 27 and over 
API =1 if respondents are Asian Pacific Islander 
AT25TO44 =1 if respondents annual income is between 
$25,000 and $44,999 
ATTNRAC =1 if respondents have attended the Naval Reserve 
Accession Course (NRAC) 17-day active duty 
training in Great Lakes 
BLACK =1 if respondents are Black 
CAUC =1 if respondents are Caucasian 
COLDEG =1 if respondents have Associates Degree or higher 
DIVORCED =1 if respondents are divorced 
FEMALE =1 if respondents are female 
GED =1 if respondents have earned a General 
Equivalency Diploma in lieu of a High School 
Diploma  
HISP =1 if respondents are Hispanic 
HSDIP =1 if respondents have earned a High School 
Diploma 
LESS25 =1 if respondents annual income less than $25,000 
MALE =1 if respondents are male 
MARRIED =1 if respondents are married 
OVER45 =1 if respondents annual income is $45,000 or 
higher 
SINGLE =1 if respondents never married 
SMCOL =1 if respondents have taken college-level courses 
but do not have a college degree 
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V. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
All four regression models have coefficients that are significant at either the 1, 5 
or 10 percent significance level.  The results for each of the four regression models are 
discussed in detail below. 
A. 28-DAY NO DEP MODEL RESULTS 
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Table 5 provides the complete logistic regression results for the 28-day no DEP 
option.  Most of the coefficients in this model are significant.  Although the R2 of this 
model does not reflect a strong goodness of fit, the LLR for joint significance was 
performed and all independent variables were found to be significant indicating that they 
should be included in the model (p= .0001). 
Examining the estimates, several results become apparent.  As the education level 
of an individual increases, the likelihood of that individual enlisting under this option 
decreases.  Similarly, those who are single or divorced have higher propensities to enlist 
under this option, as compared to married individuals. 
 
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for 28-Day No DEP Model 
 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.2928 0.2960 19.0745 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.1884* 0.1065 3.1277 0.0770 
AGE23TO26 1 -0.5104** 0.2650 3.7105 0.0541 
AGE27OVR 1 0.2809 0.2629 1.1414 0.2854 
SINGLE 1 0.5391*** 0.1215 19.6915 <.0001 
DIVORCED 1 0.3642*** 0.1424 6.5425 0.0105 
GED 1 1.1224*** 0.3303 11.5484 0.0007 
SMCOL 1 0.0428 0.1701 0.0833 0.7729 
COLDEG 1 -0.3784** 0.1672 5.1197 0.0237 
AT25TO44 1 0.1319 0.1276 1.0686 0.3013 
OVER45 1 -0.4869*** 0.1414 11.8579 0.0006 
API 1 0.0138 0.1468 0.0088 0.9251 
BLACK 1 0.1183 0.1550 0.5830 0.4451 
HISP 1 0.00610 0.1390 0.0019 0.9650 
 N=2,315 Likelihood Ratio=127.7738 
R2=0.0537 P=<.0001 
Max-Rescaled R2=0.0774 
       ***=Significant at .01; **=Significant at .05;  *=Significant at .10 
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2. Marginal Effects 
Table 6 provides the marginal effects for the coefficients from the 28-day no DEP 
model in Table 5.  The marginal effect of each independent variable is determined by 
comparing the probability of enlisting for the base case with the probability of enlisting 
when each explanatory variable is increased by one unit, or from zero to one, all other 
variables held constant. To get the percentage increase or decrease, the partial effect of 
each variable is multiplied by 100.  Those characteristics that signify a sizeable 
percentage of observations in each category form the base case.  The base case categories 
are:  MALE, AGE18TO22, MARRIED, HSDIP, LESS25, and CAUC.   
The results in Table 6 show that females are 3.35 percentage points less likely to 
enlist than males under this option.  This result is somewhat surprising.  In a 1990 RAND 
study, Hosek and Peterson41 found that when examining the individual enlistment 
decisions of young men and women, most variables were statistically equivalent for both 
males and females.  Although this study primarily dealt with active duty, is can be 
assumed that the same could be applied to the Reserves.   
The marginal effect for age shows a 9.84 percentage point lower enlistment 
propensity for individuals ages 23 to 26, as compared to those ages 18 to 22.  These 
results are not surprising as those ages 23 to 26 may be pursuing education or have 
launched a career plan they are loathe to interrupt.  What is surprising, however, is the 
fact that enlistment propensity for those ages 27 and over is no different from 18 to 22 
year olds.  Practically speaking, the individuals ages 27 and over would be less likely to 
commit to an immediate 28 days of active service because the majority of individuals in 
this age group have already invested time in a career, have family responsibilities, and 
may find it difficult to take this much time away.  In a 1989 RAND study, Grissmer, 
Buddin, and Kirby42 found that more senior enlisted personnel have more responsibilities 
and time demands from their civilian jobs as well as their Reserve job and have a more 
difficult time taking time away from their civilian job to meet Reserve commitments.  So, 
                                                 
41 J. Hosek and C. Peterson, “Serving Her Country:  An Analysis of Women’s Enlistments,” RAND, 
1990. 
42 David W. Grissmer, Richard Buddin, and Sheila N. Kirby, “Improving Reserve Compensation:  A 
Review of Current Compensation and Related Personnel and Training Issues,” RAND, September 1989. 
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this result could be attributed to the fact that the majority of the survey respondents fall 
into age category 27 and over, and are currently serving in the Reserves.  Assuming their 
Reserve experience is positive, 28 days may not seem much more to these individuals 
than the current 17-day commitment, especially since many of these individuals have 
already attended NRAC and know what to expect. 
The marginal effect of marital status in Table 6 shows that single individuals have 
a 7.74 percentage point higher propensity to enlist under this option than those who are 
married, and divorced individuals have a 5.52 percentage point higher propensity.  This 
can be attributed to the fact that single individuals do not have the family responsibilities 
of their married counterparts, and thus have the flexibility to attend a 28-day active duty 
period almost immediately after enlisting.  Although those who are divorced show a 
lower propensity than those who are single, this can be attributed to the fact that these 
individuals may still have family responsibilities; however, they have more flexibility 
than those still married, and thus are more amenable to this option.  This is supported by 
the 1989 RAND study conducted by Grissmer et al.43 who found that 25 percent of 
enlisted Reserve personnel encounter family problems with the required annual active 
duty training time and with any extra time spent on Reserve issues.  Between 10 and 24 
percent face unfavorable spouse attitudes.  This is especially prevalent for E-3s who are 
married. 
Education has an affect on propensity for those on the either end of the education 
spectrum.  The marginal effects show that, compared to individuals with a high school 
diploma, those with a GED have a 13.34 percentage point higher likelihood to enlist, but 
those who have at least a two-year degree have a 7.07 percentage point lower propensity 
to enlist under this option.  These results are not surprising as those with more education 
are more likely to have higher paying jobs or have established careers and are not as 
willing or able to serve an immediate 28 days of active duty time.  This is reinforced by 
the finding that those with an annual income above $45,000 per year have a 9.34 
percentage point lower propensity to enlist under this option than those making less than 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
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$25,000 per year.  These results are supported by the 1989 RAND study by Grissmer, 
Buddin, and Kirby44 who found that 47 percent of enlisted Reserve personnel lose 
overtime opportunities and pay as a result of Reserve service obligations. 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effects for Likelihood to Enlist: 28-Day No DEP 
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B. 28-DAY WITH DEP MODEL RESULTS 
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Table 7 provides the complete logistic regression results for the 28-day with DEP 
model.  When comparing this model to the previous one, there are definite distinctions.  
Several of the explanatory variables are insignificant such as gender and age.  Another 
noted difference is that of ethnicity, especially for Hispanics, has a significant effect.  All 
ethnic categories show a lower propensity to enlist under this option than the base case. 
 
                                                 
44 Grissmer, et al., RAND, September 1989.  
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Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for 28-Day With DEP Model 
 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error 
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1.0670 0.2678 15.8697 <.0001 
FEMALE 1 -0.1084 0.1039 1.0882 0.2969 
AGE23TO26 1 -0.1175 0.2369 0.2458 0.6201 
AGE27OVR 1 -0.1667 0.2332 0.5109 0.4747 
SINGLE 1 0.3084*** 0.1172 6.9234 0.0085 
DIVORCED 1 0.2964** 0.1401 4.4767 0.0344 
GED 1 0.5990** 0.2689 4.9624 0.0259 
SMCOL 1 0.2212 0.1631 1.8387 0.1751 
COLDEG 1 -0.1468 0.1607 0.8351 0.3608 
AT25TO44 1 0.1264 0.1229 1.0574 0.3038 
OVER45 1 -0.3151** 0.1393 5.1193 0.0237 
API 1 -0.4151*** 0.1399 8.8043 0.0030 
BLACK 1 -0.2458* 0.1483 2.7465 0.0975 
HISP 1 -0.4415*** 0.1312 11.3213 0.0008 
 N=2,291 Likelihood Ratio=73.8897 
R2=0.0317 P=<.0001 
Max-Rescaled R2=0.0452 
      ***=Significant at .01 
       **=Significant at .05 
         *=Significant at .10 
2.  Marginal Effects 
Table 8 provides the marginal effects for the 28-day with DEP model.  Under this 
option, although females show a slightly lower likelihood to enlist, the estimated 
coefficient is Table 7 is not significant.  This may indicate that when given the choice of 
enrolling in the DEP, more females are likely to enlist than when the DEP option is not 
available.  This could be attributed to the fact that females in the Reserves are less likely 
than males to be married45 and thus may have more flexibility in their schedules and be 
more are able to accommodate 28 days of active service without advance notice. 
Similarly to the 28-day no DEP model, the marginal effects of marital status show 
that single individuals have a higher propensity to enlist than married individuals (base 
case).  A difference in the results for this option, however is the likelihood for single 
individuals has declined from the first model from 7.74 percentage points to 5.42 
percentage points.  This indicates that although still willing to enlist under this option, the 
28-day no DEP option is more desirable.  For divorced individuals, there is a very slight 
                                                 
45 Department of Defense Population Representation in the Military Services, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Fiscal Year 2001.  
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decrease of .29 percentage points in the propensity to enlist under this option versus the 
28-day no DEP.  This indicates that both options are equally desirable to divorced 
individuals. 
The partial effects for education show only that those with a GED have a 
significant effect.  However, the positive effect of GED declines from 13.34 to 9.70 
percentage points.  Conversely, individuals with a GED level of education make up only 
five percent of the Naval Reserve, with the majority of Reservists having at least some 
college education.  All other education categories are significant. 
The partial effects for income show a slight increase of 2.9 percentage points in 
likelihood to enlist under this option as compared to the 28-day no DEP option.  Those 
whose annual income is $45,000 or more show a 6.44 percentage point lower likelihood 
to enlist under this option as compared to the base case.  However, the potential loss of 
income and overtime is still an issue; what may have changed for a small percentage of 
these individuals is the increased flexibility of choosing when to serve the 28 days of 
active training time, making this option slightly more desirable. 
Under this option, ethnic groups show a negative likelihood of enlisting as 
compared to the base case.  Hispanics, who are underrepresented in the Selected Reserves 
relative to the civilian population, have a 9.26 percentage point lower propensity to enlist 
under this option as compared to Caucasians (base case).  Blacks, who are over 
represented relative to the civilian population, reflect a negative propensity of 4.95 
percentage points.46  Asian/Pacific Islanders, who represent the smallest proportion at 
less than 10 percent, show a negative propensity of 8.66 percentage points when 








                                                 
46 Ibid. 
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Table 8. Marginal Effects for Likelihood to Enlist:  28-Day With DEP 
 







































                                    ***=Significant at .01 
                                      **=Significant at .05 
                                        *=Significant at .10 
C. 77-DAY NO DEP RESULTS 
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Table 9 presents the full logistic regression results for the 77-day no DEP model.  
The majority of coefficients in this model are significant at the one percent level.  
Although the R2 of this model does not reflect a strong goodness of fit, the explanatory 
variables were all significant (p-value for LLR=.0001) indicating that they should be 
included in the model. 
Some of the results in Table 9 are very similar to the results of the 28-day no DEP 
model in Table 5.  Females are less likely to enlist under this option than males.  Also, 
greater education tends to reduce the likelihood of enlisting.  Similarly, as annual income 
increases, propensity to enlist under this option decreases.  However, there are also some 
notable differences between the two no DEP options.  For the 77-day no DEP option, 
marital status is still a factor, but the results are surprisingly different.  Those who are 
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divorced show a higher propensity to enlist under this option than the 28-day no DEP 
option (when compared to those who are married).  Additionally, while there is no 
statistical differences in ethnic categories as compared to the base case in the 28-day no 
DEP option, under this option there are significant differences between ethnic categories.  
In particular, Blacks and Asian/Pacific Islanders are both more likely to enlist than 
Caucasians. 
 
Table 9. Logistic Regression Results for 77-Day No DEP Model 
 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.1486 0.2308 0.4146 0.5197 
FEMALE 1 -0.1959** 0.0961 4.1539 0.0415 
AGE23TO26 1 -0.0170 0.1979 0.0074 0.9315 
AGE27OVR 1 0.0369 0.1962 0.0354 0.8507 
SINGLE 1 0.3193*** 0.1079 8.7508 0.0031 
DIVORCED 1 0.4523*** 0.1268 12.7255 0.0004 
GED 1 0.5993*** 0.2223 7.2682 0.0070 
SMCOL 1 0.0600 0.1465 0.1677 0.6821 
COLDEG 1 -0.4231*** 0.1485 8.1154 0.0044 
AT25TO44 1 -0.1959* 0.1092 3.2190 0.0728 
OVER45 1 -0.6379*** 0.1321 23.3219 <.0001 
API 1 0.3329*** 0.1340 6.1669 0.0130 
BLACK 1 0.4300*** 0.1352 10.1163 0.0015 
HISP 1 -0.0227 0.1248 0.0331 0.8557 
 N=2,312 Likelihood Ratio=136.2659 
R2=0.0572 P=<.0001 
Max-Rescaled R2=0.0768 
***=Significant at .01 
  **=Significant at .05 
    *=Significant at .10 
 
2. Marginal Effects 
The marginal effects in Table 10 show that there is a 4.82 percentage point lower 
propensity to enlist for females.  These results reflect the same negative propensity as the 
28-day no DEP option; however, under the 77-day no DEP option, females have an even 
lower likelihood of enlisting. 
Both single and divorced individuals, are more likely to enlist than married 
individuals.  However, a somewhat surprising result is that those who are divorced show 
a much higher propensity than those who are single, at 11.24 percentage points and 7.97 
percentage points, respectively.  This differs from both the 28-day immediate and 28-day 
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DEP options where those who are single are more likely to enlist. However, in a 1989 
RAND study, Grissmer et al. found that those who are divorced participate in the 
Reserves for primarily economic reasons of meeting household expenses and paying off 
debts.47  This could help explain the higher enlistment propensity amongst those who are 
divorced. 
The marginal effects for this model show that individuals with a GED are 14.79 
percentage points more likely to enlist than high school graduates.  Conversely, those 
with at least a two-year college degree are 10.21 percentage points less likely to enlist.  
These results are not surprising as those with only a GED level of education are more 
likely to be younger, less likely to have an established career, and more likely to be single 
than those with some college education.  However, it is important to note that at least 91 
percent of the Reserve Force has at least a high school level of education,48 and GED 
holders reflect a small proportion of the population. 
The enlistment probabilities for both those who make between $25,000 and 
$44,999 and those who make more than $45,000 annually are lower than those who make 
less than $25,000 per year (base case):  as income increases, propensity decreases.  
Individuals in the middle income group have a 4.82 percentage point lower propensity 
and those in the high income group have a 15-percentage point lower propensity.  The 
results for those in the high income group are similar to those in the previous models with 
the only difference being that the size of the negative propensity is significantly greater 
under this option.  Additionally, individuals in the middle income group have never 
differed significantly from the base case in either of the two previous options.  The 1989 
Grissmer et al. RAND study found that because of the probable lost pay and overtime 
opportunities, especially for lower-ranking enlisted personnel, and possible lost  
                                                 
47 Grissmer, et al., September 1989. 
48 Department of Defense Population Representation in the Military Services.  
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promotion opportunities, many individuals are reluctant to commit to more than the one 
weekend a month.49  This could explain why under this option, both mid-range and high-
range income categories reflected a negative propensity to enlist. 
The marginal effects show that there is a 10.70 percentage point lower likelihood 
of enlistment for Blacks and an 8.30 percentage point lower likelihood of enlistment for 
Asian/Pacific Islanders.  This is interesting as neither group were significantly different 
from Caucasians under the 28-day no DEP option, and both groups showed a negative 
propensity under the 28-day with DEP option.   
 
Table 10. Marginal Effects for Likelihood to Enlist: 77-Day No DEP 
 







































P(BASE CASE) 0.00000 
                                   ***=Significant at .01 
                                     **=Significant at .05 




                                                 
49 Grissmer, et al., September, 1989. 
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D. 77-DAY WITH DEP RESULTS 
1.  Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Table 11 provides the complete logistic regression results for the 77-day with 
DEP model.  Many of the coefficients in this model are significant and the LLR test 
(p=.0001) indicates joint significance of the independent variables.  
 
Table 11. Logistic Regression Results for 77-Day With DEP Model 
 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -0.1355 0.2305 0.3456 0.5566 
FEMALE 1 -0.1862** 0.0961 3.7497 0.0528 
AGE23TO26 1 0.0114 0.1975 0.0033 0.9539 
AGE27OVR 1 0.0329 0.1957 0.0282 0.8666 
SINGLE 1 0.2442** 0.1077 5.1402 0.0234 
DIVORCED 1 0.3451*** 0.1266 7.4261 0.0064 
GED 1 0.4078* 0.2204 3.4247 0.0642 
SMCOL 1 0.1704 0.1469 1.3467 0.2459 
COLDEG 1 -0.3446** 0.1485 5.3845 0.0203 
AT25TO44 1 -0.1963* 0.1092 3.2294 0.0723 
OVER45 1 -0.5847*** 0.1316 19.7317 <.0001 
API 1 0.1885 0.1340 1.9791 0.1595 
BLACK 1 0.2355* 0.1360 2.9984 0.0833 
HISP 1 -0.0330 0.1242 0.0708 0.7902 
 N=2,291 Likelihood Ratio=100.0104 
R2=0.0427 P=<.0001 
Max-Rescaled R2=0.0573 
      ***=Significant at .01 
        **=Significant at .05 
          *=Significant at .10 
 
The results under this option are similar to those for the 77-day no DEP option.  
Females are still less likely to enlist under this option than males, reflecting only a very 
slight difference in propensity than the previous option.  Both single and divorced 
individuals are still more likely to enlist than those married; however, both groups have a 
slightly lower propensity than in the previous option. 
GED holders still show a strong positive propensity to enlist under this option, but 
this propensity has decreased from the 77-day no DEP training option by 19.15 
percentage points.  This suggests that GED holders do not find the DEP option as  
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desirable as leaving for training immediately.  Both individuals in the middle and high 
income groups reveal a strong negative propensity to enlist under this option; the effects 
are similar to those under the 77-day no DEP option.   
Blacks have a 23.55 percentage point lower enlistment likelihood under this 
option than Caucasians.  It is worth noting that although Blacks also showed a positive 
propensity for the 77-day no DEP option, under this option their propensity has declined 
by 19.45 percentage points, suggesting that the DEP is not desirable to this group. 
2. Marginal Effects 
Table 12 shows that females have a 4.59 percentage point lower propensity than 
males.  This result is similar to those in previous models.  Divorced and single 
respondents are similar to those results seen in the 77-day no DEP model and are 8.6 
percentage points and 6.10 percentage points more likely to enlist than married 
individuals.  However, the propensity to enlist is lower under this option; divorced 
individuals are 2.64 percentage points less likely to enlist under this option as compared 
to the 77-day no DEP option.  However, divorced individuals have a higher propensity to 
enlist under this option than either the 28-day no DEP or the 28-day DEP option.  For 
those who are single, there is a 1.87 percentage point lower propensity of enlistment for 
married individuals as compared to the 77-day no DEP option.  Although there is nothing 
in the literature to explain these results, it could be that both groups are not willing or not 
able to wait to begin to receive pay, as they would have to under the DEP option.   
GED holders show a 10.15 percentage point higher likelihood to enlist than high 
school graduates.  Those with a college degree have an 8.38 percentage point lower 
likelihood to enlist under this option.  However, the propensity is 1.83 percentage points 
lower for this option than for the 77-day no DEP option.  This indicates a higher 
willingness to enlist if the DEP option is available and there is some flexibility of when 




The enlistment propensity is 4.84 percentage points and 13.88 percentage points 
lower for mid-range and high-range income groups, respectively.  These effects are 
virtually the same as for the two 77-day options.  This may indicate that both 77-day 
options are undesirable and the gain in active-duty pay and training is not enough to 
offset the loss of civilian earnings.    
The only ethnic group that shows a significant marginal effect under this option is 
Blacks, who are 5.88 percentage points more likely to enlist. This is a 4.82 percentage 
point lower effect than the 77-day no DEP option, indicating that the DEP option may not 
be desirable to this group of individuals.  Since Blacks are over-represented in the 
Reserves, this is noteworthy as it indicates that the DEP option is a deterrent for this 
particular group of individuals.  This could be for purely economic reasons; however, 
there is nothing in the literature that explains this. 
 
Table 12. Marginal Effects for Likelihood to Enlist: 77-Day With DEP 
 







































P(BASE CASE)  
                                  ***=Significant at .01 
                                    **=Significant at .05 
                                      *=Significant at .10 
 
Appendix B provides a summary of the marginal effects of each variable for all 
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VI. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
There are several costs and benefits to these enlistment options for both the 
Reserves and the individuals serving in the Reserves.  Many of these can be quantified to 
show advantages and disadvantages to both parties of each option.  However, there are 
also forms of compensation and costs that are much more difficult to quantify.  One of 
the most relevant costs is the cost to Reserve readiness; while NPS personnel are 
completing the 84-day training cycle, they cannot be mobilized or placed on active duty 
for any reason other than training.  NPS personnel fill valid, funded Reserve billets that 
count against Fiscal Year end-strength numbers.  Once NPS individuals have completed 
NRAC, they are transferred from the NPS unit to a Reserve unit that is funded by an 
active duty Resource Sponsor.  NPS individuals, though, cannot deploy to the Reserve 
unit’s active-duty gaining command until the 84-day training requirement is met.  As 
such, NPS individuals impose readiness problems on both the Reserve unit and the 
gaining command.  
Reserve members also receive benefits in forms of non-wage compensation that 
can be advantageous both to the member who receives them and to the Naval Reserve, 
which uses them as recruiting tools to attract potential applicants.  However, costs are 
also incurred by these forms of compensation.  These include but are not limited to the 
following:  medical and dental benefits; veteran’s benefits; commissary and exchange 
benefits; morale, welfare, and recreation benefits; and educational benefits. 
This chapter examines both the monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits to 
both NPS personnel and the Reserves under the current program as well as for each 
proposed training alternative.  Both non-recurring and annual recurring costs are 
estimated for changes that would be instituted in the Reserve non-prior service training 
program under each alternative.  Data attained from the Reserve Forces Command budget 
office (COMNAVRESFOR N8), Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), and Recruit 
Training Command (RTC) are used to estimate current costs, the potential cost of these 
changes, and the potential savings these policy changes may produce.  
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A. NON-WAGE COMPENSATION COSTS AND BENEFITS 
There are several non-wage compensation costs that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) must incur in order to attract and retain active duty and Reserve personnel.  These 
costs are incurred by offering non-wage compensation benefits to compete with the 
civilian sector and reward individuals for the unique demands of military service.  While 
a detailed analysis of these costs is beyond the scope of this thesis, estimated active duty 
costs drawn from a 2004 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report50, and estimated 
Reserve costs drawn from a 2004 DoD report51, will be examined to give the reader an 
idea of the estimated costs to DoD of compensating one individual in the Naval Reserve.  
The costs and benefits detailed below would apply for the current NPS training program 
and all alternatives discussed in this thesis. 
1. Active Duty Non-Wage Compensation Costs 
According to the CBO, 60 percent of the total active duty military compensation 
package is non-wage compensation.  More than half consists of the accrued costs of 
retirement pensions, retirement health benefits, and veteran’s benefits such as the GI Bill 
education program.  The balance is made up of medical benefits, childcare, commissary 
and exchange benefits, and base housing, with medical benefits comprising the largest 
portion of costs at 29 percent of non-cash compensation costs, or an estimated $29,000 
per active duty member.52  Of this, 24 percent are the costs accrued by active duty 
members and their family members while 38 percent are the costs accrued for Veteran’s 
health benefits (a Veteran is defined as anyone who has served honorably on active duty 
but separated from active service prior to retirement eligibility).53   
The second largest non-wage compensation cost is attributed to installation-based 
compensation, comprising 12 percent of non-wage compensation costs, or an estimated 
$12,000 per active duty member.  These installation-based forms of compensation are 
                                                 
50 Carla T. Murray, “Military Compensation:  Balancing Cash and Noncash Benefits,” Congressional 
Budget Office, January 2004, p. 1. 
51 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Reserve Personnel 
Compensation Program Review,” Department of Defense report to Congress, March 2004. 
52 All estimated costs for non-wage compensation are based on 2002 costing data, as cited by the CBO 
January 2004 report, p. 1. 
53 Murray, p. 3. 
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provided to include the quality of life for service members and include the costs of 
subsidized meals served at on-base galleys, on-base housing, military-provided childcare, 
and discounted goods and services provided by commissaries, exchanges, and MWR-run 
programs.  The remaining non-cash compensation costs consist of retirement pay, 
veterans’ benefits such as education benefits, and miscellaneous DoD benefits, at 9, 5, 
and 2 percent, respectively.  Total non-cash compensation costs (based on 2002 cost data) 
per active duty member are $56,000.54 
Although the non-wage costs to the DoD are high, these non-wage forms of 
compensation may be more cost-effective than increasing wages.  It is believed they 
promote military readiness, increase quality of life, assist in recruiting and retention 
efforts, and provide a steady form of recompense that costs less than increasing cash 
compensation.55   
2. Reserve Non-Wage Compensation Costs and Benefits 
Under the Reserve personnel compensation program, Reservists are entitled to 
education benefits under the GI Bill similar to those of their active duty counterparts.  
Unlike active members who must pay into the program for the first 12 months of their 
enlistment, and do not have immediate access to these benefits, Reservists who agree to 
serve at least six years in the Selected Reserve are eligible for education benefits 
immediately upon completion of basic training and do not have to contribute any of their 
own money.  However, the benefit level for Reserve members is only 28 percent of what 
active duty members receive under this program.56  Therefore, based on CBO active duty 
cost data, the estimated cost per Reservist is $1,120.57   
Retirement pay is also a cost to DoD, as monies are accrued to and paid out as 
Reservists become eligible for retirement benefits.  Unlike their active duty counterparts 
who become retirement eligible upon completion of 20 years of service, Reservists must 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 2. 
55 Ibid., p. 4.  
56 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Reserve Personnel 
Compensation Program Review,” Department of Defense report to Congress, March 2004, p. 18. 
57 Cost data for Reserve non-wage compensation are estimated using CBO provided 2002 costing data 
and rough estimates rather than actual costs. 
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wait until age 60, regardless of when they have accumulated the required 20 years.  For 
active duty members, the cost is estimated to be $8,000 per member;58 it can only be 
assumed that this cost would be significantly lower per Reserve member since they retire 
at a much older age than the average active duty member who can typically retire in their 
forties. However, there is not enough information available in the literature to estimate 
what that lower estimated cost would be. 
Reserve personnel are also entitled to medical benefits; however, compared to 
active duty, these benefits are extremely limited.  While on IADT, Reservists are entitled 
to military medical care for any injury or illness that is incurred while in the line of duty 
during the drill period.  For Reservists who are in an Active Duty for Training (ADT) 
status, medical benefits are the equivalent to active duty members if the period of ADT is 
greater than 30 days; in any period less than 30 days, Reservists are entitled to medical 
care only for injuries and illnesses incurred while in the line of duty during the active 
duty period.  Reserve family members are not entitled to military medical care unless the 
individual is in a long-term active duty status such as mobilization.  Military medical 
benefits are afforded to Reserve retirees, but only upon reaching age 60.59  Although 
there is nothing specific in the literature addressing Reserve medical costs, it can be 
assumed that these costs are substantially lower than for active duty as active duty 
members and their families receive full medical benefits while the individual remains on 
active duty and upon retirement from active service.  
The benefit hoped to be gained from offering Reservists non-wage compensation 
benefits similar to those of their active duty counterparts is to provide incentives for those 
enlisting in the Reserves, and to retain these individuals in a drilling status, supplying a 




                                                 
58 Murray, p. 2. 
59 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs, Pay, Benefits, and Entitlement 
Eligibility, September 2001, p. 3. 
60 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, p. 43. 
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B.  CURRENT 17-DAY BASIC TRAINING 
Under the current training program, the Naval Reserve Activities (NRAs) are 
responsible for Phase I, Phase II, and Phase IV training of all NPS personnel.  However, 
there are no authorized billets at the NRA’s for full-time personnel assigned to conduct 
NPS training.  Coordination and supervision of training is assigned as a collateral duty, 
normally to either a second or first class petty officer, or in some instances, a Chief Petty 
Officer.  They are in charge of the NPS Reserve unit, which, on average, consists of 60 
NPS personnel.  These individuals must balance their full-time job responsibilities while 
maintaining a rigorous training schedule to prepare NPS personnel for the 17-day active 
duty training at Great Lakes (Phase III).  Their tasks include class instruction, physical 
training, and administrative responsibilities such as seabag issue, upkeep of service 
records, and meeting medical and dental requirements.  Several of the NRA full-time 
staff often conduct instruction on the various training subjects.  Currently, the average 
total time for each NPS individual to complete the required 84 days of training is 27 
months or 2.3 years.   
1. Current Program Estimated Costs 
The cost of recruiting one NPS individual into the Reserves is $5,470, which is 
lower than the $12,145 cost per recruit for the active Navy.  This total results from 
recruiting processing costs incurred through payment of bonuses, the military pay for the 
recruiters, the civilian pay of recruiting support staff, advertising, and operations and 
maintenance of the recruiting program.  These cost categories are outlined in Table 13.61   
In FY-03, 5,071 NPS personnel were accessed into the Naval Reserves.  Under 
the current training program, NPS personnel drill one weekend a month until they leave 
to attend active-duty training (AT) in Great Lakes.  On average, they leave for Great 
Lakes seven months after they have enlisted, or 14 drill days.  For FY-03, 3,583 NPS 
personnel completed NRAC training at Great Lakes.62  This number will also be used to 
                                                 
61 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003, Department of Defense Cost Per 
Recruit as extracted from the Office of Secretary of Defense DD804 Reports and converted to FY-03 
dollars by using inflation factors from the Programming and Budgeting Information System (PBIS). 
62 Recruit Training Command, NRAC Division, Navy Integrated Training Resources Administration 
System (NITRAS), May 2004. 
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estimate the number of NPS personnel who go on AT each Fiscal Year.  The average 
NPS individual holds the rank of E-3; these individuals earn $46.90 of base pay per drill 
period, or $93.80 of base pay per drill day.  There are four drill periods in a two-day drill 
weekend, totaling $187.60 of base pay per drill weekend.63  Each NPS individual is 
issued an initial seabag, which has an approximate cost of $289.21.  This cost covers all 
the initial uniform needs for new accessions including all insignia, nametapes, shoes, and 
personal items.  Each fiscal year approximately 30 percent of seabags ordered are never 
picked up due to various reasons such as attrition and disqualification of NPS individuals.  
Approximately 14 percent of NPS accessions per Fiscal Year separate from the Naval 
Reserve during the first seven months, while only 2 percent separate once they have 
attended NRAC.64  The 17-day NRAC in Great Lakes cost the Reserves $252.14 for each 
individual in residence.  This cost covers the cost of food, berthing and ditty bag per NPS 
recruit.65 The estimated daily cost is $14.83 per recruit.   
Once NPS individuals have completed NRAC, they drill for eleven months, or 22 
drill days.  They then must complete another AT period, which on average is from 14 to 
17 days, in order to fulfill their annual training requirement. (For this thesis, all active 
duty for training periods other than the actual basic training periods will be based on a 
17-day period).  They must then drill for another seven months, or 14 drill days, to fulfill 
their 84-day requirement and become qualified Reservists. (For this thesis, it is assumed 
that those accessions who did not attend NRAC still drilled at least as many drill days as 
those who did attend).  For the two 17-day active duty-training periods, NPS individuals 
receive active duty pay, which is on average $308.63 per day.66  Table 13 shows the 
estimated current training program costs to the Naval Reserve. 
 
                                                 
63 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Fiscal Year 2004 Reserve Drill Pay Chart. 
64 Jeff Knuth and David Rudd, 28-day proposal letter dated 10 July 2003. 
65 Recruit Training Command, NRAC Division, Navy Integrated Training Resources Administration 
System (NITRAS), May 2004.  
66 Commander Naval Reserve Forces Command, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Department of the Navy 
Budget Estimates. 
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Table 13. Summary of Estimated Costs Under Current Training Program* 
 
Cost Category Dollar amount/recruit Number of NPS Total Cost (rounded to nearest dollar) 
Recruiting  
      Enlisted Bonus 
      Military Pay 
      Civilian Pay 
      Advertising 
      Operations and 
          Maintenance 
      Total 
 
$   423 
$3,536 
$     92 





Drill Pay (per drill 
day) 
$     93.80 50 drill days * 5,071 $23,782,990 
Seabag $   289.21 5,071 $  1,466,584 
Annual Training $   308.63 34 AT days * 3,583 $37,597,924 
RTC Costs/Recruit $   252.14 
($14.83/day) 
3,583 $     903,418 
Total Est. Costs $6413.78  $91,489,640 
*All costs based on FY-03 estimates.67   
C. PROPOSED 28-DAY TRAINING ALTERNATIVE  
Under the 28-day proposal, the NRAC training in Great Lakes would be extended 
from 17 days to 28 days.  Under one option, the training would commence immediately; 
under the second option, the NPS individual would be in the DEP until their training 
commencement date.  For this section, it will be assumed that all individuals leave 
immediately.  The DEP will be discussed separately later in this chapter.  No 
infrastructure changes in Great Lakes would be needed to accommodate the additional 
days because current utilization is well below capacity.  Current annual capacity of the 
NRAC training facility at RTC Great Lakes is 6,000, whereas just over 3,500 NPS 
individuals attended in FY03.68  NRAC training would still be conducted separately from 
the active duty recruits.  However, there would be additional responsibilities for the 
MEPS, as the NPS individuals would be processed there for transfer to RTC Great Lakes.  
This would include coordination between the MEPS enlisted liaison and the Reserve 
recruiter to ensure the successful transfer of each NPS individual to Great Lakes.  Order 
processing and travel arrangements could still be completed through the Naval Reserve 
Order Writing System (NROWS), which would be handled by the NRA training 
                                                 
67 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003. 
68 Recruit Training Command.  
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department.  Upon completion of the 28-day training, each NPS Reservist would return to 
the NRA with which they are affiliated and are assigned to the NPS unit until completion 
of their 84 days of required training. 
Under the current training program, Phase I, II, and IV training are currently 
conducted at the Reserve Centers; Reserve Centers are constrained by these training 
requirements to sending only those NPS individuals to Great Lakes who have completed 
Phase I and II.  Phase IV is completed upon completed of NRAC.  However, under the 
proposed 28-day training alternative, all phases of training would be completed at Great 
Lakes during the extended active training period so the training constraint would no 
longer be an issue.  This may allow for more NPS accessions to complete NRAC sooner 
than they are able to under the current program.   
The initial medical physical would be conducted at the MEPS (currently an 
acceptable option).  Dental requirements would be completed once the individual reports 
to RTC Great Lakes for training.  Coordination of these tasks is currently the 
responsibility of the NRA.     
The costs and advantages detailed below will be based on the assumption that 
individuals leave immediately for training in Great Lakes.  Under the 28-day training 
alternative, the average total time required to complete the 84 days required is 22 months 
or 1.10 years, which is five months less than the time required under the current program. 
1. Proposed 28-Day Program Estimated Costs 
Under the assumptions above, the costs under this program are similar to those in 
the 17-day program.  Since the marginal effects of this program outlined in Tables 8 and 
10 show very little negative recruiting effects from the extended active duty time, it is 
assumed that recruiting costs would remain $5,470 per NPS accession. Individuals would 
still be issued a seabag; however, it would be issued upon commencement of training in 
Great Lakes as is done for active duty members.  NPS individuals would still be required 
to drill; they would drill for 12 months (24 drill days) upon completion of the 28-day 
active-duty period.  Then, they would be obliged to complete another 17-day active  
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training period.  Following this active duty period, they would have to drill for another 8 
months (16 drill days) in order to complete the 84-day active duty training requirement.  
Table 14 illustrates the estimated costs of the 28-day proposed alternative training policy. 
 
Table 14. Summary of Estimated Costs Under 28-Day Proposed Training Program* 
 





      Enlisted Bonus 
      Military Pay 
      Civilian Pay 
      Advertising 
      Operations and   
        Maintenance 
Total 
 
$   423 
$3,536 
$    92 




5,071  $27,738,725 
Drill Pay/drill day $     93.80 40 drill days* 3583  
10 drill days* 1488** 
$13,443,416 
$  1,395,744 
Seabag $   289.21 3,583 NPS $  1,036,239 
AT $   308.63 45 AT days * 3583  $49,761,958 
RTC costs/recruit $14.83 * 28 days 3,583  $  1,487,805 
Total Est. Costs $6577  $94,863,887 
*All costs based on FY-03 Estimates.69   
**The remainder of NPS accessions who did not attend NRAC would have to complete the required drills for the 
Fiscal Year. 
 
2. Proposed 28-Day Program Estimated Benefits 
There are several benefits under the proposed 28-day alternative training program.  
Since NPS individuals report directly to RTC Great Lakes for their active duty-training 
period, tasks that are currently performed at the NRA’s would be reduced.  Under the 
current program, NRA personnel must conduct both the physical and classroom training 
needed to prepare recruits for NRAC.  On average, this takes seven months per NPS 
recruit, and places a huge burden on the NRA staff, as these duties are typically collateral 
duties.  However, with the extended active-duty time, Phase I, II, and IV training 
requirements would all be completed at Great Lakes.  NPS personnel would be provided 
with trained instructors whose only responsibility would be to ensure that NPS personnel 
receive thorough training in all required areas.  The Reserve center staffs would be  
                                                 
69 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003. 
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alleviated of this collateral duty, which would enhance service to other drilling Reservists 
because all Reserve Center staff members would be focused on their full-time 
responsibilities.   
Second, under the 28-day alternative, NPS accessions would be processed through 
the MEPS, which would be responsible for ensuring that NPS individuals reached RTC 
Great Lakes successfully.  Currently, this responsibility falls to the NRA staff who must 
coordinate travel, prepare orders, and manage all administrative record upkeep.  There 
would also be a lightened burden on the supply system, as all seabag issuance would be 
done when NPS personnel arrive at RTC.  Additionally, there would be a cost savings for 
the Naval Reserve since no seabags would be ordered for individuals who leave the 
Naval Reserve.  On average, 30 percent of the total seabags ordered per fiscal year, or 
approximately 1,521 seabags (based on 5,071 NPS Fiscal Year accessions) are never 
picked up.   
A third benefit is that NRA medical personnel would no longer have to process, 
track, and treat NPS personnel for entry-level and follow-up medical and dental care.  
This would allow NRA personnel to focus on providing annual physicals and dental 
check-ups to keep other drilling Reservists mobilization and deployment ready. 
Since NPS personnel enlist and report immediately for active duty training, the 
Naval Reserve would no longer have to pay these individuals for the approximately seven 
months they currently drill prior to leaving for NRAC. In FY-03, 3,583 attended NRAC, 
so any savings would apply to all who attend.  This is more than a monetary savings; 
NPS attrition is approximately 14 percent in the first seven months prior to NRAC; 
attrition sharply declines to approximately 2 percent once individuals have completed 
NRAC.70  This is assumed to be because Reserve personnel have completed the active 
duty training, a source of apprehension for many Reservists.  For 5,071 annual NPS 
accessions, which equates to an estimated 423 accessions per month, approximately 415 
NPS individuals would separate from the Naval Reserve in the first seven months.  So, 
the Naval Reserve would not only save the drill pay for these seven months, but would 
                                                 
70 COMNAVRESFOR study on NPS attrition as cited by Knuth, Jeffrey and David Rudd, 28-day 
proposal letter dated 10 July 2003. 
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also save on the recruiting costs of accessing personnel to replace those who would have 
separated.  Under the assumptions above, the recruiting cost savings are $2.27 million, 
the drill pay savings for the seven months are $3,4 million, and the savings in seabags 
that are not picked up are $.43 million, for a total estimated savings of $6.07 million.  
However, Table 14 shows total estimated costs under the 28-day program to be $94.8 
million, a $3.3 million increase over the $91.5 million current total training costs.  So, for 
the 28-day training proposal, there would be an estimated net savings of $2.8 million 
($6.07m-$3.3m).  Table 15 outlines the estimated cost savings under the proposed 28-day 
training program as compared to the current program. 
 
Table 15. Summary of Estimated Savings Under 28-Day Proposed Training Program* 
 
Savings Category Dollar Amount/recruit Number/category 
Total Savings (rounded to 
nearest dollar) 
Recruiting  $5,470 415 attrites $2,270,050 
Drill Pay/drill day $    93.80 10 drill days * 3,583 $3,360,854 
Seabag  $  289.21 1,521  $   439,888 
Total Est. Savings $5,853  $6,070,792 
*Dollar amounts based on FY-03 Numbers and rounded to the nearest dollar71   
 
D.  PROPOSED 77-DAY TRAINING PROGRAM 
This program would be modeled after the active-duty basic training program used 
to train new active duty recruits.  The active duty training period in Great Lakes would be 
extended from 17 days to 77 days.  It should be noted that although active basic training 
is currently only 70 days, an additional 7 days have been added to cover any processing 
time needed to bring NPS Reservists on active duty.  Under one option, training would 
commence immediately; under the second option, NPS personnel would enter the DEP 
until their training commencement date.  For this section, it will be assumed that all 
individuals commence training immediately.  The DEP will be discussed separately later 
on in this chapter.   
 
 
                                                 
71 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003. 
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Currently, active recruits report to Great Lakes for approximately 10 weeks.  RTC 
Great Lakes has an annual training capacity of 89,000 recruits, and a 10-week capacity of 
16,168 recruits.  However, approximately 45 percent of recruits are trained during the 
months of June through September.  For FY-03, 34,299 active Navy recruits were trained 
at RTC Great Lakes, which is approximately 38 percent of the current annual capacity.72   
Active recruits are staggered for training by using the DEP option and assigning 
reservations throughout the year as recruits enlist.  Upon arrival, recruits are formed up 
into companies of approximately 80 to 88 recruits.  Each company has three Recruit 
Division Commanders (RDCs) who are charged with the training and guidance of their 
company recruits for the entire 10-week period.   
The recruiting process would remain unchanged, as Reserve and active recruiting 
have been integrated.  However, recruiting may become more difficult due to the longer 
active duty period, which may make recruiting goals more challenging to meet.  Under 
this program an average of 59 percent of personnel surveyed stated that they were not 
likely to have enlisted had this option been in place.  This is more than half of the current 
NPS population, which could jeopardize the Reserves’ ability to meet end-strength.  To 
counteract this effect, more recruiters and recruiting incentives may be required.  All of 
these factors combined may add substantial cost to the recruitment of NPS accessions.  
However, there is a potential argument that although NPS accessions and subsequently 
Reserve end-strength may decline, more Reservists would be available for mobilization 
and deployment, offsetting the loss of potential recruits.  Although the Naval Reserve 
currently meets end-strength, the majority of NPS personnel are virtually ineffective 
since they cannot be assigned to fulfill any Reserve requirements until completion of 
their training.  Under the 77-day training proposal, the Reserves may recruit less in 
numbers, but will actually gain in assets that can be used.   
MEPS responsibilities would also increase under this option.  All NPS accessions 
would go through the same in-processing as their active duty counterparts; this may raise 
costs at the MEPS and require additional personnel to handle the extra workload.  Since 
                                                 
72 Bureau of Naval Personnel, Code N00T24, Director of Naval Education and Training, May 2004. 
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MEPS and active-duty manpower requirements are funded by military personnel-navy 
(MPN) appropriations, and Reserve training and manpower requirements are funded by 
Reserve military personnel-navy (RPN) appropriations, an agreement between the 
Reserve and Active Components may be necessary to work out any funding issues and 
manpower requirement issues for any supplementary personnel needed.  
Under this option, NPS Reserve personnel would be integrated into the active 
duty recruit companies; the separate training track currently in place would be 
discontinued.  Each recruit company would consist of both Reserve and active recruits, 
and the term “NRAC” would no longer be used.  The training personnel currently in 
place to administer the NRAC would be integrated with the training personnel 
administering basic training to active duty recruits.  This may also require the Reserve 
and Active Components to address any manpower requirement issues that may arise.  
In a manner similar to the 28-day alternative, seabags would be issued upon 
arrival at RTC.  Additionally, all medical and dental issues that could not be handled by 
the MEPS would be handled by RTC upon arrival.   
NPS personnel would not drill prior to reporting to Great Lakes for training.  
Coordination between the Reserve recruiters and the MEPS active duty Navy liaisons 
would be necessary to ensure each NPS individual’s successful arrival at the MEPS 24 
hours prior to their report date to Great Lakes and their subsequent transfer to RTC Great 
Lakes.  NROWS would no longer be used to cut orders for NPS personnel.  All 
paperwork and process scheduling completed at the MEPS would have to identify each 
member as a “Reserve Non-prior Service Applicant” and the MEPS enlisted processor 
would need to coordinate with the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) Code N321, to 
obtain a standard document number for completion of Initial Active Duty for Training 
(IADT) orders.73    
 
                                                 
73 Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting Command Draft Instruction 1133, “Non-Prior Service 
(NPS) Basic Program,” May 2003. 
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Upon completion of basic training, NPS individuals would report to the NRA and 
would begin drilling with a regular unit.  NPS units would no longer be necessary so the 
end-strength currently in place for those requirements could be disseminated throughout 
the Reserves; some of this end-strength could possibly be used to establish Reserve 
liaison billets in both the MEPS and RTC Great Lakes to smooth the integration of 
Reserve and active recruit training. 
The costs of the 77-day training alternative would be substantial; however, there 
would also be a substantial benefit for the Reserve Force.  Under this option, each NPS 
individual would have completed the 84-day training requirement four months after 
completion of basic training.  Unit readiness and Reserve readiness as a whole would be 
substantially improved.   
1. Proposed 77-day Program Estimated Costs 
The estimated costs under this proposed alternative are similar to those in both the 
28-day alternative and the current program.  In some instances however, the costs could 
be considerably higher.  One area in particular would be recruiting.  The marginal effects 
for this alternative show a decline in the likelihood to enlist as compared to the current 
program and the 28-day policy alternative.  This could result in the need for more 
recruiters, longer recruiter hours, and more difficulty making the recruiting goals for 
Reserve accessions.  Assuming that NPS accession numbers would decrease by almost 60 
percent, the current estimated recruiting cost of $5,740 per NPS accession could increase 
by $6,314 for an estimated total per accession cost of $12,054.   
Seabags would still have to be issued; however, this would be done upon each 
NPS individual reporting to Great Lakes.  Also, NPS individuals would still be required 
to drill upon completion of basic training; to complete the 84-day training requirement, 
they would have to drill for four months, or 8 drills.   
The capacity of the active-duty training facility is much larger than the NRAC 
facility, so for this alternative, it will be assumed that the entire number of FY-03 NPS 
accessions could complete the program under the 77-day alternative.  Table 16 outlines 
the estimated costs of the 77-day alternative training policy. 
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Table 16. Summary of Estimated Costs Under 77-Day Proposed Training Program  
 
Cost Category Dollar Amount/Recruit Number of NPS Total Cost (rounded to nearest dollar) 
Recruiting**  
      Enlisted Bonus 
      Military Pay 
      Civilian Pay 
      Advertising 
      Operations  
        and  
        Maintenance 









5,071  $61,125,834 
Drill Pay/drill day $93.80 14 drill days * 5071 $6,659,237 
Seabag $289.21 5,071  $1,466,584 
Annual Training $309 77 AT days * 5071  $120,509,830 
RTC Costs/Recruit $14.82 * 77 days 5071  $5,786,721 
Total Est. Costs $13,887.15  $162,161,097 
*Dollar amounts based on FY-03 Numbers.74  
**It is assumed that the costs in all recruiting subcategories would increase but by how much is unknown 
without further research.  
  
2. Proposed 77-Day Program Estimated Benefits 
The 77-day alternative has the same benefits as the 28-day alternative.  The 
NRA’s would be alleviated of much of the workload associated with preparing NPS 
personnel for NRAC, as these responsibilities would be absorbed by both the MEPS and 
RTC Great Lakes.  Additionally, the 14 percent attrition rate currently experienced by the 
Naval Reserve of NPS personnel prior to attending NRAC may be alleviated, saving on 
recruiting costs.75 
Paying NPS personnel drill pay prior to their completion of the mandatory 84-day 
training day would be virtually eliminated; only 4 months, or 8 drill days would be paid 
prior to the training requirement being met.   
The biggest benefit of the 77-day training alternative is that NPS personnel would 
complete the 84 days of required training almost immediately after enlisting.  Inclusive of 
basic training, NPS individuals would be able to mobilize and deploy 6 months after 
enlistment.  This is 21 months earlier than under the current program and 15 months 
                                                 
74 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003.  
75 COMNAVRESFOR study on NPS attrition as cited by Knuth, Jeffrey and David Rudd, 28-day 
proposal letter dated 10 July 2003. 
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earlier than the 28-day training alternative.  Though it would be difficult to quantify this 
without in-depth research, the benefits to the Naval Reserve in terms of unit and 
individual readiness would be substantial.   
Table 17 shows the estimated savings under the 77-day training alternative.  
Under the assumptions above, the recruiting cost savings are $2.3 million, the 23 months 
of drill pay saved is $21.9 million, and savings in seabags not picked up are $.43 million, 
for a total savings of $24.6 million.  However, Table 16 shows estimated costs under the 
77-day program to be $162.2 million, a $70.7 million increase over the $91.5 million 
current training costs.  The 77-day training proposal would have an estimated net cost 
increase of $46.1 million.  Appendix B provides a summary of all costs and benefits for 
the current training program and both alternative training proposals. 
 
Table 17. Summary of Estimated Savings Under 77-Day Proposed Training Program* 
 
Savings Category Dollar Amount/recruit Number of NPS 
Total Savings (rounded to the 
nearest dollar) 
Recruiting  $5,470 415 attrites $2,270,050 
Drill Pay/drill day $93.80 46 drill days * 
5,071 
$21,880,351 
Seabag  $289.21 1,521  $439,888 
Total Est. savings $5853.01  $24,590,289 
*Dollar amounts based on FY-03 Numbers.76   
 
E.  DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM 
The delayed entry program (DEP) is a recruiting tool currently used by active-
duty recruiters to provide potential recruits more flexibility in deciding when they will 
attend basic training.  DEP allows individuals to delay up to 365 days before they have to 
ship out.  Further, it provides the active Navy with an effective method of utilizing its 
training resources while minimizing training variability.  This is accomplished by 
scheduling new recruits throughout the year through the Navy recruiting reservation 
                                                 
76 Commander, Naval Recruiting Command Fiscal Year 2003. 
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system.  Recruits are given a reservation date that guarantees them a seat during a 
specific basic training period.  Without the DEP, recruiters would be forced to ship 
recruits at the start of each training cycle, reducing the flexibility of choice for the recruit 
and causing extreme variability in training numbers.77 
While in DEP, new recruits have obligated themselves to the Navy, but they draw 
no pay.  The time accrued in DEP, however, does count toward retirement. 
1. Recruiter Responsibilities78 
In order for the DEP to be successful, recruiters must keep track of those enrolled.  
This requires constant contact between the recruiter and his or her applicants.  First, 
monthly DEP training meetings must be held to ensure that all new accessions are 
equipped with the necessary knowledge needed to excel at Great Lakes.  These training 
meetings provide many of the general training lessons learned by NPS personnel during 
Phase II of the current program, and include such items as the rank recognition, the 
Sailors Creed, and common Navy acronyms. 
Second, recruiters must sit down with each applicant to outline goals and 
expectations for DEP time.  This includes assisting with career goals, counseling on 
required coursework, and providing all study material necessary for new recruits to 
prepare for basic training. 
Third, recruiters are responsible to speak with each applicant at least three times 
monthly; this can include the monthly training meeting. 
2. Recruit Responsibilities79 
While enrolled in DEP, new recruits must maintain eligibility requirements.  
These include maintaining acceptable body fat and physical training levels, completing 
all required coursework, and attending the monthly training meeting.   
 
                                                 
77 Michael K. Nakada, “Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition:  Recruits, Recruiters, Contracts, and 
Economics,” Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, November 1994, p. iv. 
78 Navy Recruiting Command Delayed Entry Program Guide, 
http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/cnrc/dep/recruiter. Accessed May 2004. 
79 Ibid. 
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3. Potential Costs to the Reserves  
If either the 28-day or 77-day alternative training policy was implemented, the 
DEP would need to coordinate and control the flow of NPS Reserve recruits through the 
training facilities at Great Lakes as is currently done under the active duty DEP program.  
This would require training for all Reserve recruiters on lesson plans, and the tracking 
methodology currently used by active recruiters to ensure required monthly contacts are 
met.  However, this training could be accomplished relatively easily since the Reserve 
and active recruiting commands have merged into a single organization.  Since there is 
currently crossover between the two recruiting Components, introducing the DEP into the 
NPS accession program should not be too costly.  It should be noted, however, that this 
DEP time would also count toward retirement for Reservists, and would need to be 
accounted for if trying to quantify the cost of establishing Reserve DEP.  Also, these 
costs would only apply to NPS Reserve accessions; NAVETS and OSVETS are not 
required to attend basic training since they are coming off active duty.  These 
assumptions are the author’s, as there is nothing in the current literature that addresses 
this issue.  A summary of these costs are include in Table 18. 
4. Potential Benefits to the Reserves 
If either the 28-day or 77-day proposed training alternative was implemented, 
Reserve recruiting would likely see a decline in its NPS accession numbers, particularly 
under the 77-day option.  Reserve training is unique; potential NPS applicants may 
already have a full-time job, be attending school full-time, or have families they are 
loathe to leave for an extended time.  With DEP as an option, Reserve recruiters would 
have a tool that would allow the potential NPS individual some control over when they 
would attend the longer active duty training.  This may also make it more palatable to 
potential applicants who may balk when initially hearing about the longer required active 
training time.  Additionally, introducing the DEP to the Reserves further aligns it with the 
active duty Navy, providing standardization and cohesion between the two Components.  






Table 18. Summary of Costs and Benefits of Implementing the Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) for NPS Reserve Accessions 
 
ADVANTAGES 









Increased Flexibility for 
NPS Accessions of 





DEP Coordination and 
Tracking 
Recruiters 








Drill Pay Savings Naval Reserve   
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VII.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The current Reserve NPS accession program is a successful recruiting tool that 
attracts quality individuals into the Reserves.  One of the reasons for its success is the 
relatively short basic training period of 17 days.  However, it is also the program’s 
biggest disadvantage since all Reservists must complete 84 days of active training before 
they can be deployed or mobilized.  Because the majority of this training time is done 
through drill weekends, it takes an average of 2.3 years per NPS accession before they 
become fully qualified Reserve assets. 
A 28-day and 77-day alternative training policy to the current NPS training 
program are examined to see the effects a more lengthy training period may have on both 
NPS recruiting and Reserve readiness.  A web-based survey was given to all NPS 
personnel currently in a drill status to see if they would still have enlisted in the Reserves 
if either one of the two alternatives were in place.  Demographic questions were included 
in the survey.   
Tabulations are made by Age, Gender, Race, Marital Status, Number of Children, 
Education, Income, PayGrade, Length of Service, and whether or not they had already 
attended NRAC to estimate the likelihood of enlisting under one of the two training 
options.  For the 28-day alternative that offered no DEP option, the responses were 
positive across all categories, but showed lower likelihoods for those in older age 
categories, Caucasians, married individuals, those with children, those with a college 
degree, and those in the highest income group.  Gender did not seem to matter as both 
groups showed a high likelihood of 72 percent.  For the 28-day alternative that included 
the DEP option, across all categories, with a few notable exceptions, showed a lower 
propensity than when DEP was not an option.  Caucasians and those individuals in the 
highest income group showed a more positive response when DEP was an option. 
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For the 77-day alternative, sharp declines in likelihood are apparent across all 
demographic categories; those in the highest categories still show a propensity of 50 
percent or less.  The 77-day no DEP option showed that those in the younger age 
category, those not married, those with no college education, minorities, and those in the 
lower income brackets were most likely to enlist under this option.  Respondents showed 
the least propensity for the 77-day with DEP option, although this option seemed to be 
more attractive to those older, more educated, and in the highest income groups than the 
no DEP option.   
All four training options seemed to be most attractive to those who are younger, 
are high school graduates, and in the lowest income brackets.   
Chapter V shows the multivariate regression results that use data taken from the 
survey results.  Four separate models are shown to examine the results across both 28-day 
options and both 77-day options.  Independent variables for personal characteristics were 
used in all four models, with the dependent variable for each model reflecting the option 
being examined.   
The results of all four models are similar to those found in the cross-tabulations, 
with some exceptions.  For the 28-day no DEP model and both the 77-day models, 
females show a lower likelihood to enlist than males.  For the 28-day no DEP model, 
individuals ages 27 and over showed a higher likelihood to enlist.  For both the 28-day 
and 77-day with DEP models, minorities showed a lower likelihood to enlist than when 
DEP was not an option.  Divorced individuals show a more positive response to the 77-
day no DEP option than either of the 28-day options.  A summary of the marginal effects 
for all four models can be found in Appendix B. 
Chapter VI examines the costs and benefits for the current NPS training program 
as well as both 28-day and 77-day training options.  Additionally, the active duty DEP 
program is examined.  FY03 cost data and accession numbers were used to calculate 
estimated costs and savings for all programs.  Under the current program, it takes an 
average of 27 months for an NPS individual to complete the 84 days of training.  During  
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this time, these individuals drill at the Reserve Centers prior to their 17-day basic training 
at Great Lakes.  The estimated cost to the Reserves per NPS recruit under the current 
training program is $6,414, with an estimated total cost of $91.5 million.   
For the 28-day training option, no drills are performed by the NPS recruit prior to 
attending basic training at Great Lakes.  All training currently conducted at the Reserve 
Centers would be completed at RTC.  All medical, dental, and administrative processing 
would be conducted by the MEPS and issuance of uniforms would be done at RTC.  This 
option would result in the average NPS recruit completing the required 84-days in 21 
months, 5 months sooner than the current program allows.  The estimated cost to the 
Reserves per NPS recruit under the 28-day training option is $6,577, with an estimated 
total cost of $94.9 million.  The estimated savings per NPS recruit is $5,853, with an 
estimated total savings of $6.07 million.  Under this option, there is an estimated total net 
savings of  $2.8 million. 
The 77-day training option is set up the same as the 28-day option.  However, 
under this option, the average NPS recruit would complete the required 84 days of 
training in 6 months, inclusive of basic training.  So, all required drills would be 
completed after the first four months following basic training.  This allows for each NPS 
individual to complete the required training 21 months sooner than the current program 
allows, and 15 months sooner than the 28-day option allows.  The estimated cost to the 
Reserves per NPS recruit is $13,887, with an estimated total cost of $162.2 million.  The 
estimated savings per NPS recruit is $5,853, with an estimated total savings of $24.6 
million.  Under this option, there is an additional estimated cost of $46.1 million.  These 
additional costs can be attributed to the longer active duty period as well as the additional 
recruiting costs due to the decline in propensity of potential NPS individuals to enlist 
under this option.   
The Reserve DEP option would require training for all Reserve recruiters.  This 
could be accomplished quite easily since active and Reserve recruiting have been 
integrated.  The DEP would require constant monitoring and contact with those enrolled,  
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which could potentially add costs to the current program.  However, it would allow full 
training integration of Reserve and active recruits, and allow for a smooth throughput of 
Reserve recruits throughout the training cycle.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored alternative training options to the current Reserve NPS 
accession program.  Since September 11, 2001, world events have required the 
mobilization of personnel across all Reserve Components.  During the mobilization 
process, it became apparent that the current training program for NPS did not adequately 
meet the needs of Naval Reserve readiness. 
The current Reserve NPS accession program is able to attract enough quality 
applicants for the Reserves to meet end-strength requirements, even with the decline in 
the availability of veterans.  However, these individuals cannot be fully utilized for 
Reserve missions for almost two and a half years after they enlist.  This decreases 
Reserve readiness since these individuals cannot contribute to unit readiness, nor can they 
individually deploy.  This becomes especially problematic during times of mobilization.  
Currently, 92 percent of NPS accessions cannot be mobilized because of the lack of 
required training time.  Additionally, the current structure of the NPS accession program 
places a huge burden on Reserve Centers who are tasked with the training and processing 
of all NPS personnel.  These responsibilities become collateral duties to senior full-time 
support personnel; Reserve Centers do not have funded requirements for full-time NPS 
trainers.   
The study shows that there would likely be a decrease in enlistments if either the 
28-day or 77-day training option were implemented; this decrease is minimal for the 28-
day option, but substantial for the 77-day training option, especially for the current 
demographic makeup of NPS personnel.  Currently, the majority of NPS personnel are at 
least 27 years old, are married with children, and have already established careers or are 
in school full-time.  However, if the recruiting focus was to shift to recruiting individuals 
during their senior year of high school, the impact of the lengthier training periods may 
be minimized.  These individuals show the highest likelihood to enlist under either 
option.    
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If either option were implemented, the DEP would have to be available to allow 
potential recruits some flexibility in the scheduling of the active duty basic training 
period.  With the unique nature of being a Reservist, this would be a necessary recruiting 
tool to make these options more attractive. 
Both the 28-day and 77-day options would shorten the time it currently takes for 
NPS personnel to complete the required 84 training days; this is much more substantial 
for the 77-day program since NPS personnel would be fully qualified four months after 
attending basic training as opposed to the 21 months it would still take under the 28-day 
option.  Additionally, Reserve Centers would no longer bear the burden of training and 
processing NPS personnel, and the training of these individuals would be more aligned 
with the active duty personnel.   
Both training options would likely result in higher costs.  However, with the 
savings that are also estimated, the 28-day option would actually be less costly to the 
Reserves than the current program.  The 77-day option would cost more than the current 
program because of the lengthy active duty period.  However, these costs would need to 
be weighed against the advantages that the Reserves would have a much more trained and 
ready force that currently exists.  This not only applies to the actual monetary costs 
incurred, but the costs of potentially not meeting end-strength due to the decline in the 
number of potential enlistees.  Although the Reserve Force currently meets end-strength, 
in large part due to the number of NPS accessions, these individuals cannot be utilized for 
over two years, but are filling valid, funded requirements, and are being paid to fill them.   
Of the two options, the 77-day, full basic training option would better enhance 
Reserve readiness by providing fully trained NPS personnel almost immediately after 
enlistment.  Unit readiness would increase, and the Reserves could better meet the needs 
of the active duty gaining commands, and the Resource Sponsors who fund the 
requirements.  Additionally, Reservists would be fully integrated with their active duty 
counterparts, so both active duty and Reserve recruits would receive identical training 
instead of the segregated training currently in place. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the 77-day program should be 
conducted.  This should include a complete assessment of the current MEPS, RTC, and 
CNRC processes to see what changes would be necessary to meet the needs of this 
program.  A complete requirements analysis should be done to examine if extra 
manpower requirements would be necessary with the added workload.  Included in this 
analysis should be the potential integration of full-time support personnel into these 
programs to allow for cross training between full-time support and active duty personnel.  
Since both the MEPS and RTC currently perform some functions involving Reserve 
recruits, expanding these functions currently in place should be a consideration.  This 
would allow for the smooth processing of all recruits, regardless of active or Reserve 
affiliation. 
Both active and Reserve recruiter training should be analyzed to incorporate 
cross-training so any recruiter, regardless of Reserve or active, would be able to process 
both active and Reserve accessions and ensure the smooth transition of these individuals 
into Naval service.  Since recruiting for both Components has already been consolidated, 
this could be accomplished quite easily. 
A thorough analysis of the DEP should be conducted to examine the costs 
associated with implementing it for the Reserves.  These costs should include accrued 
retirement, attrition while in the DEP, and the added costs of managing the additional 
personnel in comparison to the current program in place. 
Based on the information available and the analysis conducted in this thesis, 
several recommendations appear to be warranted.  The current NPS accession program 
should be phased out until all those who have enlisted under the current training policy 
have completed NRAC.  The 77-day with DEP training alternative should be 
implemented immediately for all new NPS accessions, and the recruiting focus should 
shift to primarily target high school seniors recent graduates (age group 18-22).  Both 
cash and non-cash costs would increase in the short-term.  Training, active duty pay, and 
recruiting costs would likely increase.  Although end-strength may not be met in the first 
few years, long-term benefits should outweigh these costs.   
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New Reserve accessions would receive the required training immediately, 
enhancing their performance and readiness to fulfill the requirements of the billets 
assigned.  This training would be conducted alongside their active duty enlisted 
counterparts, aligning the two Components more closely and streamlining the training 
process.  With the initiative underway to integrate the Naval Reserve Force with active 
duty Navy, this training proposal would foster integration from the time of enlistment.  
Additionally, NPS personnel would no longer be constrained from deploying, 
participating in active-duty exercises, and mobilizing.  This would greatly increase both  
individual, unit, and overall Reserve readiness.  Even with negative effects on end 
strength, the Reserve units would be more fully qualified to complete their missions since 
each NPS individual would have all necessary baseline training and could participate and 
contribute to all Reserve unit tasks.  The Reserve Centers would be better equipped to 
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For questions 1 through 10, please fill in the most appropriate response 
 
1.  What is your age? 
 ○ 18-22 
 ○ 23-26 
 ○ 27-34 
 ○ 35 and over 
 
2.  What is your gender? 
 ○ Male 
 ○ Female 
 
3.  What is your race?  
 ○ Caucasian 
 ○ Hispanic 
 ○ Black 
 ○ Asian/Pacific Islander 
 ○ Other 
 
4.  What is your marital status? 
 ○ Never been married 
 ○ Divorced 
 ○ Married 
 ○ Separated 
 
5.  How many children do you have? 
 ○ None 
 ○ One 
 ○ Two 
 ○ Three 









6.  What is your highest education level attained?  
 ○ GED 
 ○ High School Diploma 
 ○ Some College 
 ○ Associates Degree 
 ○ Bachelors Degree 
 ○ Masters Degree 
 ○ Doctoral Degree 
 
7.  What is your annual income? 
 ○ Less than $25,000 
 ○ $25,000 - $34,999 
 ○ $35,000 - $44,999 
 ○ $45,000 - $54,999 
 ○ $55,000 - $64,999 
 ○ $65,000 and over 
 
8.  What is your current pay grade? 
 ○ E1 
 ○ E2 
 ○ E3 
 ○ E4 
 ○ E5 
 ○ E6 
 
9.  How long have you been affiliated with the Naval Reserve? 
 ○ Less than one month 
 ○ Two to three months 
 ○ Four to six months 
 ○ Six to nine months 
 ○ Nine to twelve months 
 ○ More than twelve months 
 ○ More than twenty-four months 
 
10.  Have you attended the Non-Prior Service Accession Course (NPSAC)/Naval Reserve 
Accession Course (NRAC)?   
 ○ Yes 











11.  Please rank order your top four choices as to why you decided to enlist in the Naval 
Reserve.  Use 1 to indicate the most important factor, 2 to indicate the second most 
important factor, etc. 
 __ Commissary/Exchange Benefits  
 __ Education Benefits 
 __ Extra Income  
 __ Gain job experience 
 __ Learn a new skill 
 __ Medical/Dental Benefits 
 __ Retirement Benefits   
 __ Serve my country 
 __ Travel   
 
For questions 12 and 13, please indicate the most appropriate response.   
 
12.  I would affiliate with the Naval Reserve if I had a 28-day active duty basic training 
obligation that commenced immediately after enlisting.  
 ○ Extremely likely 
 ○ Likely 
 ○ Not very likely 
 ○ No Chance 
 
13.  I would affiliate with the Naval Reserve if I had a 77 day active duty basic training 
obligation (full boot camp completed with active duty recruits) that commenced 
immediately after enlisting.  
 ○ Extremely likely 
 ○ Likely 
 ○ Not very likely 
 ○ No Chance 
 
For questions 14 and 15, please use the explanation of delayed entry below to assist you 
in answering the questions:  
  
Delayed Entry status:  A program under which an individual may enlist in the Naval 
Reserve and specify a future reporting date to attend the active duty period for basic 
training.  While in the Delayed Entry Program, you would not be in a drilling status, and 







14.  I would affiliate with the Naval Reserve if I had a 28-day active duty basic training 
obligation, and was in a delayed entry status until I was able to attend. 
 ○ Extremely likely 
 ○ Likely 
 ○ Not very likely 
 ○ No Chance 
 
15.  I would affiliate with the Naval Reserve if I had a 77-day active duty basic training 
obligation, (full boot camp completed with active duty recruits) and was in a delayed 
entry status until I was able to attend.  
 ○ Extremely likely 
 ○ Likely 
 ○ Not very likely 
















APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF 
THE VARIABLES USED IN THE FOUR MODELS 
































































































***=Significant at .01 
  **=Significant at .05 
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATED COSTS AND 
BENEFITS FOR CURRENT AND PROPOSED TRAINING 
PROGRAMS 




ALTERNATIVE (rounded to 
the nearest dollar) 
Costs    
    Recruiting $27,738,725 $27,738,725 $61,125,834 





   Seabag $1,466,584 $1,036,239 $1,466,584 
   Annual  
     Training 
$37,597,924 $49,761,958 $120,509,830 
  RTC 
Costs/Recruit 
$903,418 $1,487,805 $5,786,721 
  Total Est. Costs $91,489,640 $94,863,887 $162,161,097 
Benefits    
  Recruiting   $2,270,050 $2,270,050 
  Drill Pay/drill 
day 
 $3,360,854 $21,880,351 
  Seabag   $439,888 $439,888 
  Total Est. 
Benefits 
 $6,070,792 $24,590,289 
Net 
Costs/Benefits 
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